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AN APPEAL FROM ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION ON REMAND 
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT, SALT LAKE COUNTY, UTAH, 
THE HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON, PRESIDING 
APPELLANT'S JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction of this Court is conferred pursuant to the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 
78-2a-3(2)(i) (Supp. 1993) This action involves the appeal of certain provisions of Findings 
of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on Defendant's Petition for Modification on Remand 
signed and entered in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah on January 20, 1994. A timely Notice of Appeal was filed on February 8, 1994. 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
Copies of the following are found in Addendum A to this brief: 
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5 (1993 Supp.) 
Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 1988) 
Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992) 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a final Order on Defendant's Petition for Modification 
on Remand entered by the lower court pursuant to this Court's remand of the case in Muir 
v. Muir, Case No. 900603-CA, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992). The Defendant/Appellant 
Michael D. Muir filed a Petition for Modification seeking to modify the parties' Decree of 
Divorce entered in September 1985. Mr. Muir sought to reduce or terminate his alimony 
obligation on the grounds that his income had decreased since entry of the decree; that Mrs. 
Muir had become employed since the time of the divorce; that he had remarried and had new 
expenses; and that he was contributing to the support of the parties' adult children. The trial 
on Mr. Muir's petition was held October 11, 1990, and the lower court found that Mr. 
Muir's income had in fact been reduced and Mrs. Muir's income had increased, thereby 
establishing a significant change in circumstances to modify alimony. The trial court entered 
its order reducing alimony from $1,500 per month to the amount of $900 per month, and 
awarding Mrs. Muir $3,000 towards her attorney's fees. Mrs. Muir appealed, and this 
Court remanded the case back to the trial court for adequate findings supported by the 
evidence on the issues of substantial change of circumstances, alimony and attorneys fees. 
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On remand, the lower court entered its Order denying Mr. Muir's Petition to Modify, 
thereby maintaining the original alimony award of $1,500 per month, and ordered Mr. Muir 
to pay all of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees and costs. Mr. Muir filed his Notice of Appeal 
dated February 8, 1994, and a Docketing Statement dated March 2, 1994. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A. Background. 
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced by a Decree of Divorce entered on September 
16, 1985. (R. 87-93) In August of 1989, Defendant filed a Verified Petition to Reduce and 
Eliminate Alimony. (R. 98-102) The petition came on for trial on October 11, 1990 in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable 
Homer S. Wilkinson, presiding. The trial court found that there had been a substantial 
change of circumstances since entry of the Decree of Divorce to justify a reduction in 
Defendant's alimony obligation. The trial court reduced Plaintiff's award from $1,500 to 
$900 per month and ordered Defendant to pay $3,000 of Plaintiffs attorney's fees. (R. 178-
180) 
At the time of trial on Defendant's Petition, these facts were presented to the Court: 
The parties and their respective counsel entered into a settlement stipulation on August 23, 
1985, which formed the basis for their divorce. Pursuant to the stipulation incorporated into 
the Decree of Divorce, the "property as . . . divided adjusted for payment of the debts of the 
parties ... [was] an equal division of the property with each of them being awarded 
approximately one-half of the value of the marital estate". (R. 91) Mrs. Muir received 
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property valued at approximately $416,000, including the marital residence valued at 
$370,000, the Mercedes Benz valued at $10,500, shares of water stock valued at $10,000, a 
Cottonwood Country Club membership valued at $1,000 and cash in the amount of $25,000. 
Mr. Muir was awarded all of the common stock in Fairmont Bowl owned by himself and 
Mrs. Muir, together with other assets valued at approximately $77,500. The parties agreed 
that Mrs. Muir should receive alimony in the amount of $1,500 per month, and it was so 
ordered by the court. 
B. Financial Circumstances of Mr, Muir and Fairmont Bowl. 
Throughout the Muir marriage, Mr. Muir supported his family with income from 
Fairmont Bowl, Inc., a Utah Subchapter S corporation which, until recently, he had owned 
and managed jointly with his father, Douglas Muir. (Tr. 16, 20-21) At the time of trial, 
Douglas Muir no longer owned stock in Fairmont Bowl. (Tr. 59, 61) During each year of 
the marriage and subsequent to the divorce, Mr. Muir received compensation from Fairmont 
Bowl, plus a profit allocation based on his percentage ownership of the business. (Ex. 3; Tr. 
20-21) By 1990, Mr. Muir was a 96.61% shareholder. (Ex. 3; Tr. 113-114) This increase 
in stock ownership resulted from post-divorce gifts of stock from Mr. Muir's father. (Tr. 
24, 31, 59) 
Fairmont Bowl operated on a fiscal year ending June 30. For tax purposes, the 
income of Fairmont Bowl as an S Corporation was reflected on the personal income tax 
returns of Mr. Muir, who was then assessed both personal and corporate taxes. Each tax 
return declared Mr. Muir's previous calendar year income and Fairmont Bowl's previous 
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fiscal year income (Tr. 8), but did not show the actual day-to-day, month-to-month matching 
of individual and corporate income and expenses. For example, Mr. Muir's 1989 income tax 
return included his January 1, 1989 to December 31, 1989 income, but Fairmont Bowl's July 
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1, 1988 to June 30, 1989 income. 
Since Mr. Muir was the majority shareholder of Fairmont Bowl at time of trial, for 
purposes of accurately determining the amount of income available for payment of his 
alimony obligation, it was necessary to look at the combined financial positions of Fairmont 
Bowl and Mr. Muir. (Tr. 147) Though the corporation used fiscal accounting and Mr. Muir 
used calendar year accounting, for trial Mr. Muir's income was adjusted by the accountant 
for Fairmont Bowl, Ed Bates, to match the corporation's fiscal year finances as follows: to 
each relevant fiscal year of the corporation, Ed Bates added back Mr. Muir's compensation 
for the same twelve month time period. (Tr. 8, 19) 
The financial statements of Fairmont Bowl and Mr. Muir's finances were, after 
calendar to fiscal year adjustment, combined and summarized by Ed Bates, a CPA and 
partner of the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand, which had been preparing federal 
income tax returns on behalf of Fairmont Bowl, Mr. Muir and Douglas Muir for the past 19 
years prior to trial. (Exs. 1 and 3; Tr. 16) All combined income of Fairmont Bowl and Mr. 
Muir for the fiscal years 1983 through 1990 was reflected in Exhibits 1 and 3 submitted at 
trial. (Tr. 67) 
In 1985, the year of the divorce, Mr. Muir's compensation was $52,800 and his 
profit allocation was $65,777, for total earnings before tax of $118,577. (Exs. 1 and 3; Tr. 
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22, 214) By 1990, there had been a significant drop in Mr. Muir's total earnings, with 
compensation decreasing to $48,400 and profit allocation decreasing to $33,235, for a total 
earnings before tax of $81,635. (Exs. 1 and 3; Tr. 214) During the years 1986 through 
1989, Mr. Muir's total earnings before tax ranged from $61,228 to $70,938. (Exs. 1 and 3) 
The reasons for the significant drop in Mr. Muir's earnings since 1985 were related 
directly to the bowling industry and climate and the age of Fairmont Bowl's facility. Since 
1985, the bowling industry had declined, and there were many fewer bowlers in 1990 than 
there were in 1985. (Tr. 62-63) Mr. Muir and his father had forestalled a significant 
decrease in the gross receipts of Fairmont Bowl, despite annual inflation of 4 to 6 percent, 
by increasing prices to fewer bowlers. (Tr. 27, 28 and 62) To justify increasing prices. Mr. 
Muir had to increase services and had, by doing so, also incurred additional business 
expenses. (Tr. 64) In essence, the income of Fairmont Bowl, from 1986 to 1989, remained 
steady while its expenses increased. (Tr. 37-38) 
At the time of the trial on Defendant's Petition, the Fairmont Bowl facility was old, 
and no major equipment had been replaced since 1958. (Tr. 65) Although Mr. Muir 
remained competitive by computerizing his scoring devices and making physical 
improvements to the center, including painting, wall coverings, new carpet, new ball racks 
and new bowler seating, the bowling lanes themselves were then thirty years old and worn 
out. The replacement cost was estimated at $35,000 apiece. (Tr. 75-76, 65, 157) The 
replacement costs were to be met from gross revenues or from loans obtained by Fairmont 
Bowl. (Tr. 66) 
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As the majority shareholder of Fairmont Bowl, Mr. Muir managed the business and 
exercised discretion over how business funds were to be spent. The business must remain 
competitive to survive, however, and between 76 to 82% of the gross receipts of Fairmont 
Bowl between 1986 and the time of trial were used by the business to pay normal operating 
expenses. (Ex. 3; Tr. 215) The income remaining after payment of operating expenses was 
subject to the discretion of Mr. Muir. In years when Mr. Muir elected to take higher than 
normal compensation, the corporation suffered a loss; and Mr. Muir received a loss rather 
than profit allocation. (Tr. 11-12, 40, 67, 152) If Mr. Muir borrowed money from 
Fairmont Bowl, he was required to pay that money back. 
Despite Mr. Muir's increase in percentage ownership of Fairmont Bowl, his overall 
earnings had gone down significantly since 1985 and the time of trial. (Tr. 23) The gross 
profits of Fairmont Bowl had decreased, and the net income of Fairmont Bowl before paying 
Mr. Muir's compensation and before deducting depreciation decreased in all but one year 
since 1985. (Ex. 3; Tr. 28-29) 
Mr. Muir incurred attorney's fees in the amount of $6,000 related to his Petition for 
Modification. (Tr. 196) 
C. Mrs. Muir's Financial Circumstances. 
Mrs. Muir had a college degree in commercial art. (Tr. 28) Prior to the divorce, she 
was employed by Fairmont Bowl. (Tr. 155) When the parties separated, her employment 
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with Fairmont Bowl terminated, and by the time of the divorce in 1985, Mrs. Muir was 
operating a business, Rocky Mountain Vacation Homes, from which she did not receive 
income. (Tr. 43-44, 161) At the time of trial, Mrs. Muir had been employed by American 
Airlines since May of 1987. (Tr. 42, 167) 
At the time of the divorce, Mrs. Muir was awarded the marital residence valued at 
$370,000. (R. 71, 88) The total monthly obligation on the residence was $939, including a 
$609 mortgage, $260 in property taxes, and a $70 insurance premium. (Ex. 26; Tr. 45) 
Beginning in May, 1987 and throughout the remainder of that year, Mrs. Muir's 
residence was vacant. (Tr. 46) Through 1988, she rented her residence to friends for $600 
per month, but she continued to pay the utilities on the residence. (Tr. 46-47) Through 
1989, Mrs. Muir rented her residence to friends for one month at $600 rent, and the 
remaining 11 months at $700 per month, and continued to pay the utilities. (Tr. 47-48) In 
June, 1990, the marital residence was rented pursuant to a one-year lease which ran from 
June 1990 through June 1991 for $1,200 per month, and the tenants were required to pay 
their own utilities. (Tr. 45) 
Mrs. Muir also owned a barn on which she was receiving rental income in the amount 
of $220 per month at the time of trial. (Tr. 168) 
Since 1986 up until trial, Mrs. Muir had received annual income from the Wetherill 
Trust, a trust established by her grandfather. The disbursements increased from $1,200 per 
year in 1986 to $1,961 per year in 1989. (Ex. 25; Tr. 163) 
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Mrs. Muir's income from employment, disbursements from Wetherill Trust and rental 
income on her residence, but excluding alimony, in the years 1985 through September 15, 
1990 was as follows: 
Year Gross Income without Alimony 
1985 0.00 
1986 $4,549.00 
1987 $12,959.00 
1988 $22,281.00 
1989 $30,870.00 
1990 (thru 9/30) 16,924.00 
(Ex. 25; Tr. 44, 163) 
The 1990 income figure was derived by dividing Mrs. Muir's year-to-date gross 
income from American Airlines as of September 1990, in the amount of $12,724.39 by 9 
months for average monthly earnings of $1,400. Her average monthly earnings were then 
multiplied by 12 months for 1990 annual income of approximately $16,924.00. (Tr. 167) 
This figure did not include Mrs. Muir's supplemental residential income of $1,200 per 
month, barn rental income of $220.00 per month, Wetherill trust income, interest or 
dividend income. 
Mrs. Muir's 1989 gross income as declared on her 1989 federal income tax return 
was $20,600 of wages, $1,900 of dividend income, $262 of interest income and $8,300 of 
rental income from the marital residence. (Ex. 2; Tr. 33-34) 
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Mrs. Muir incurred attorney's fees defending against the Petition to Modify in the 
approximate amount of $16,000. (Tr. 194-195) 
Mrs. Muir appealed the lower court's reduction of Mr. Muir's alimony obligation and 
the award of her attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the case to 
the lower court to enter adequate findings, supported by sufficient evidence, regarding 
whether the material circumstances of the parties had or had not substantially changed in 
ways not contemplated by the original decree. (See Muir v. Muir. 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 
1992)). The Court of Appeals also remanded for entry f adequate findings relating to Mrs. 
Muir's financial need and Mr. Muir's ability to pay attorney's fees together with the 
reasonableness of the fees. (Id at 741.) 
D. Proceedings Subsequent to Remand. 
After the case was remanded to the lower court, both parties filed motions for entry 
of supplemental findings with the court. (R. 211-217 and R. 223-224) Defendant requested 
a hearing before the court on three occasions and filed an objection to Mrs. Muir's proposed 
findings. (R.239-243) No hearing was granted by the court to hear the parties' respective 
arguments in support of their motions for entry of supplemental findings on remand. The 
only hearing held by the court before it issued its minute entry on December 22, 1993, in 
which it essentially adopted the supplemental findings prepared by Plaintiff, was held in 
chambers, off the record, and with only counsel present. In the December minute entry, the 
court adopted the Findings of Fact as submitted by the Plaintiff, with a few interlineations 
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made by the court, and instructed Plaintiff's counsel to prepare the final Findings and Order. 
(R. 281) The court concluded that it had been reversed by this Court and had erred by 
finding a substantial changes of circumstances and reducing Defendant's alimony obligation. 
The court reinstated the full amount, ordered Defendant to pay the unpaid amounts that 
accrued during the pendency of the appeal in the total sum of $23,400, and ordered 
Defendant to pay all of Plaintiff's attorney's fees and costs, including costs incurred on 
appeal, in the total unpaid amount of $21,192.50, for a total of $44,592.50. (R. 293-295) 
Mr. Muir appeals the court's order denying his Petition to Reduce and Eliminate 
Alimony and ordering him to pay all of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees and costs. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. The lower court failed to comply with this Court's mandate on remand. It 
failed to make findings on all material issues, and its failure to do so constituted reversible 
error. 
2. The findings made by the court on remand are inadequate and against the clear 
weight of evidence, thus making them clearly erroneous. 
3. As a result of the lower court's failure to comply with this Court's mandate on 
remand and its complete reversal of its prior decision based upon the same evidence, this 
Court should enter its own order on the motions and documents submitted by the parties on 
remand and adopting Mr. Muir's supplemental findings. 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE LOWER COURT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE MANDATE OF 
THIS COURT ON REMAND TO ENTER ADEQUATE FINDINGS TO 
SUPPORT ITS ORDER. AS A RESULT, THE ORDER ENTERED SHOULD 
BE REVERSED AND ONCE AGAIN REMANDED. 
When a case is remanded, a lower court has the duty to comply with the mandate of 
this Court, or its order should be reversed. In its previous decision in this case, this Court 
concluded that the lower court had failed to make adequate findings to support its decision 
that there had been a substantial change in circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduction in 
Mr. Muir's alimony obligation. In remanding the case for entry of adequate findings, this 
Court did so with very detailed instructions as to what findings were necessary. Specifically, 
the lower court was to make the findings which addressed the following evidence: 
(a) The decrease in Mr. Muir's income when his ownership in the business 
increased by eighteen percent; 
(b) The evidence that the company substantially reduced its liabilities in 1988; 
(c) The evidence relating to statements made by Mr. Muir as to his net worth in 
credit applications made since the decree; and 
(d) The testimony regarding "loans to shareholders" on the books of the business 
amounting to cash not included in Mr. Muir's compensation. 
In addition, this Court determined that the lower court failed to make adequate 
findings on the issue of whether Mr. Muir benefitted beyond the salary that he earned and 
whether or not the need to invest significant amounts of capital into his business in the 
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immediate future was discretionary or whether it was necessary to maintain the business in 
its present condition. On these issues, the lower court was instructed to "enter adequate 
findings, supported by sufficient evidence, regarding whether the material circumstances of 
these parties have or have not substantially changed in ways not contemplated by the original 
decree such that modification of the decree may be warranted." (Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 
736,741 (UtahApp. 1992). 
Finally, this Court concluded that the lower court also failed to make adequate 
findings regarding Mrs. Muir's need for attorney's fees, Mr. Muir's ability to pay her 
attorney's fees, and the reasonableness of the fees incurred. (Id. at 742.) 
On remand to the lower court, Mr. Muir submitted Defendant's Motion for Order in 
Re: Entry of Supplemental Findings of Fact, dated April 14, 1993, (R. 211-217) and after 
Mrs. Muir failed to respond within the time provided by Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial 
Administration, Mr. Muir subsequently filed his Notice to Submit and Request for Ruling 
dated April 26, 1993. (R. 218-19) Mrs. Muir's counsel filed an Objection to the Notice to 
Submit on April 26, 1993. (R. 222) More than three weeks later, on May 17, 1993, she 
filed own her Motion, Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order of Modification on 
Remand. (R. 223-238) 
Without allowing Mr. Muir the requisite time to respond to Mrs. Muir's Motion, the 
lower court signed and entered Mrs. Muir's Order on May 26, 1993, only nine days after it 
was submitted. (R. 236-238) Mr. Muir objected to entry of the Order, (R.239-243) and the 
trial court recognized its premature decision and allowed the parties to schedule a hearing. 
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At the same time, Mr. Muir filed his Objections to Mrs. Muir's proposed findings of fact, 
setting forth specific evidentiary bases that her proposed findings were not supported by the 
evidence. (R. 244-254) He also filed a Request for Hearing on June 15, 1993 (R 262-263), 
a second request on July 13, 1993 (R-266-267), and a third request on September 30, 1993. 
(R. 272-273) At no time did Mrs. Muir file an objection to the supplemental Findings of 
Fact submitted by Mr. Muir. 
Although purporting to grant a hearing on the respective motions, the lower court 
simply met with counsel in chambers, without a court reporter, to make its determinations 
regarding the issues to be addressed. In its Minute Entry dated August 19, 1993, the court 
simply stated with regard to that hearing that Mr. Muir's objections were "discussed but not 
resolved." (R. 268) At no time thereafter did the court grant Mr. Muir's requests for a 
hearing wherein counsel could argue the evidence in the record in support of their respective 
findings. Thereafter, by Minute Entry dated December 22, 1993, the lower court, without 
ever holding a hearing as requested, entered Mrs. Muir's findings with a few handwritten 
interlineations and modifications. (R. 281) Based on these findings and without taking any 
additional evidence, the lower court did a one hundred and eighty degree turn, finding no 
change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a reduction in Mr. Muir's alimony obligation. 
The court entered judgment against him for all amounts due since entry of the first order 
from which appeal was taken in the amount of $23,400. In addition, the court entered 
judgment against Mr. Muir for all of Mrs. Muir's attorney's fees incurred in this case, 
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including her fees on appeal in the amount of $21,192.50, for a total judgment of 
$44,592.50. (R. 293-295) 
The findings which the court made in support of its decision on remand are as 
follows: 
6. The Defendant alleged specific changes in circumstances in that 
although his gross revenues from his business had remained consistent, that his 
expenses had increased, depreciation had decreased and his business needed 
capital investment. 
7. Plaintiffs accountant Mr. Randall Peterson, CPA, analyzed 
seven years of tax returns from 1983 through 1989 filed by the Defendant. He 
testified that the returns showed an average "pre-divorce" income to Defendant 
of $104,678 and an average "post-divorce" income of $104,188. Accountant 
Peterson analyzed the Defendant's "net spendable income" from 1983 to 1989 
showing his post-divorce average (excluding alimony payments), to be $69,194 
which was approximately $5,000 more than his before divorce average of 
$68,819. 
8. The Defendant's accountant Mr. Ed Bates agreed with Plaintiffs 
accountant that the gross revenues of the Fairmont Bowl Corporation have 
been consistent and that it has been operated as a Subchapter S Corporation 
since the parties' divorce. On this point, the accountants relief on the 1985 
tax return for the fiscal year ending June 30,1985 showing gross receipts to be 
$691,529 as compared with gross receipts at the end of fiscal year June 30, 
1990 where gross receipts were $645,102. 
9. The Defendant has made improvements to the Fairmont Bowl 
facility and had just finished computerizing the facility, added new carpeting, 
new racks, new seating and other improvements since the divorce. Defendant 
testified to the need for future improvements as well. Such capital 
improvements are in the discretion of Defendant whose personal and business 
finances are intertwined. 
10. Since the divorce, Defendant has prepared four separate 
financial statements for First Interstate Bank which show that his total assets 
and net worth since entry of the divorce as stated by him have increased from 
at least $715,580 in assets on the statement dated January 3, 1986 to $989,000 
in assets on a statement dated September 7, 1989. 
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11. Both Plaintiffs and Defendant's accountants testified that due to 
the corporations' Subchapter S status, the Defendant had total discretion over 
the amount he took as compensation each year, in setting prices for his 
product, and in making capital expenditures. 
12. The Defendant's business has paid for many personal expenses 
for the Defendant and his family including payments for his family car, health 
insurance, travel, auto and life insurance, tax deferred benefits including 
pension contributions. Defendant benefits from his new wife drawing a salary 
from the corporation. 
13. Based on the foregoing evidence and Findings, the Court finds 
that there has not been a substantial change in the circumstances surrounding 
Defendant's earnings since the parties' divorce. His income has been 
consistent when all personal benefits are considered and given the Defendant's 
discretion over allocating income between personal and business uses, it is 
appropriate to include all such personal benefits. 
14. The Court finds that the Plaintiffs only work during the 
marriage was at Fairmont Bowl where her wages were approximately $1,000 
per month. At the time of the modification hearing Plaintiff was working as a 
flight attendant for American Airlines earning $1,400 gross monthly income. 
Plaintiff's employment required her to locate on the East Coast where she 
resided in a basement apartment in her mother's home in Connecticut for 
which she paid rent. 
15. Plaintiff has attempted to sell the marital asset she received in 
the divorce consisting of the parties' marital residence in Salt Lake City valued 
at $370,000 at the time of the divorce. The Plaintiff had lowered the sales 
price to $280,000 and had received only one offer of $185,000 which she 
rejected. She has continued to maintain the Salt Lake home as a rental 
property and paying the mortgage thereon. 
16. At the time of Trial on October 1990, the Plaintiff's rental 
income to date had been $4,200 and her mortgage costs had been $5,478 with 
additional estimated taxes of $3,000 which would result in an income loss that 
year. 
17. Plaintiffs monthly living expenses totalled $4,701 per month 
which included keeping two homes and $907 per month on installment debt 
relating to legal fees connected with the original divorce and to repay her 
mother a $4,000 loan. 
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18. Since the divorce Plaintiff has had significant periods of 
unemployment, higher costs of living with the necessity of maintaining two 
homes, and her tax returns show regular losses from business and real estate. 
Plaintiff has been dependent on her alimony of $1,500 per month to meet her 
basis living expenses which do not include any of the luxuries or amenities she 
enjoyed during her marriage to Defendant such as vacations, country club 
memberships, or new vehicles. 
19. A review of Plaintiffs tax return shows that in only one year, 
1988, did her earned income exceeded her alimony income, when she earned 
$20,609 in wages. However, for the year 1990 Plaintiff projected total 
earnings of only $17,000 which is less than her alimony. Although Plaintiffs 
income may have increased from $1,000 to $1,400 per month it is not 
sufficiently large of a change to support a reduction of alimony in this case 
considering Plaintiffs needs. 
(R. 282-292) 
These findings relating to the income and financial circumstances of the parties are 
legally insufficient to support the court's decision on remand because they fail to address key 
issues identified by this Court in its decision on the prior appeal. Contrary to the express 
instructions by this Court, the lower court failed to make findings: a) as to why Mr. Muir's 
income had significantly decreased when his ownership in the business increased by eighteen 
percent; b) as to the reason for the reduction of the company's liabilities in 1988; c) as to the 
"loans to shareholders" reflected on the books of the business; and d) whether Mr. Muir's 
expenditures for capital improvements were discretionary or necessary to maintain the 
business in its present condition. 
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Turning next to the findings which the lower court made to support its award to Mrs. 
Muir of all attorney's fees incurred by her in this action, there is only one: 
22. The Court finds Plaintiff has a need for attorney's fees based on 
her financial circumstances including the fact that her present monthly 
expenses exceed her monthly income. In addition Plaintiff is still paying on a 
significant balance for legal fees remaining from her original divorce. The 
Plaintiff also had a significantly more difficult task to defend against the 
modification brought by Defendant to uncover necessary financial information 
whereas Defendant had that information within his control. The Defendant has 
also paid off significant debts since the time of the parties' divorce, has 
invested in costly real estate and is building a home, and thus has the ability to 
assist Plaintiff in the payment of fees. Defendant should pay the full amount 
of Plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of $15,779, less credit for the 
$3,000 he was ordered to pay at the initial trial in this matter for an attorney 
fee award of $12,779. 
(R. 289-290) 
While this finding purports to address the financial needs of Mrs. Muir and Mr. 
Muir's ability to pay her attorney fees, it is completely devoid of any discussion relating to 
the reasonableness of the fees and costs incurred. This omission is contrary to this Court's 
specific mandate to "make independent findings regarding the reasonableness of all fees and 
costs of all the attorneys Wife has employed to defend the petition to reduce and eliminate 
alimony, including fees incurred on appeal." (Muir, 841 P.2d. at 742.) 
As outlined by this Court in Carlton v. Carlton, 756 P.2d 86 (Utah App. 1988), the 
failure to make findings on material issues, especially in light of this Court's specific 
instructions, constitutes reversible error: 
The trial court must make findings on all material issues, and its 
failure to do so constitutes reversible error "unless the facts in 
the record are 'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of supporting 
only a finding in favor of the judgment.' " In addition, the 
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findings must be sufficiently detailed and consist of enough 
subsidiary facts to reveal the steps the court took to reach its 
conclusion on each factual issue presented. 
Id. at 87. (Citations omitted.) 
Applying this principle to the facts of this case, the lower court failed to make 
findings which it was specifically instructed to make by this Court on remand, both on the 
issue of a substantial change of circumstances not contemplated at the time of the decree as 
well as on the reasonableness of the attorney's fees. The findings mandated by this Court 
are material to the issues upon which the lower court ruled, and as this Court pointed out in 
the original appeal, the facts in the record are not so clear as to be capable of supporting 
only one judgment. Therefore, at the very least, the decision must be reversed and 
remanded once again for adequate findings amply supported by the record rather than a 
simple and complete reversal in the decision reached. However, in light of the lower court's 
complete disregard of this Court's mandate as established by the procedure which the lower 
court employed to reach its decision, Mr. Muir asks this Court to rule on the parties' 
motions on remand, together with Mr. Muir's objection to Mrs. Muir's proposed findings. 
The appellant believes that the Court will conclude that Mr. Muir's findings are the only 
findings amply supported by the evidence. Therefore, Mr. Muir requests this court remand 
the case with specific instructions to enter the Supplemental Findings submitted by Mr. Muir 
and an Order consistent therewith, in addition to an order requiring each party to pay their 
own attorney's fees and costs incurred by them. 
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POINT II 
THE FINDINGS MADE BY THE TRIAL COURT ARE 
INADEQUATE AND AGAINST THE CLEAR WEIGHT OF 
THE EVIDENCE, THUS MAKING THEM CLEARLY 
ERRONEOUS 
It is the appellant's duty to "marshall all of the evidence" in support of the lower 
court's findings and then establish that it is insufficient to sustain the court's findings on 
appeal. In such circumstances, the findings are against the clear weight of the evidence and 
clearly erroneous, and therefore, they must be vacated. (See Oneida/SLIC v. Oneida Cold 
Storage and Warehouse, 336 U.A.R. 24, 872 P.2d 1051 (Utah App. 1994) and Ohline Corp. 
v. Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602 (Utah App. 1993).) 
In this case, the lower court's findings, even marshalling all of the evidence in the 
record to support them, are inadequate and cannot stand. To begin first with Finding no. 19 
that Mrs. Muir had earnings of $1,000 per month at the time of the parties' divorce, there is 
simply no evidence to marshall in support of it. In fact, the evidence that she did not have 
any income at the time of the divorce was uncontroverted at the trial on Mr. Muir's petition 
to modify. Her own testimony was that she had "no real income" in 1985, the year that the 
parties were divorced (Tr. 43), and that in 1986, she earned between "$3,000 and $4,000." 
(Tr. 43) There was simply no evidence from which the court could find that Mrs. Muir's 
income at the time of the divorce was $1,000 per month. Since the court relied on this 
finding to conclude that there had been no material change of circumstances in Mrs. Muir's 
financial condition since entry of the decree, the conclusion of law is likewise erroneous. 
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Mr. Muir does not challenge the court's finding that, at the time of trial, Mrs. Muir 
was earning $1,400 per month as a flight attendant for American Airlines. However, much 
more evidence was received at trial relating to Mrs. Muir's financial condition upon which 
the court failed to make any findings whatsoever. Specifically, Mrs. Muir testified that she 
received at least $100 per month from a family trust (Tr. 43); $220 per month from the 
rental of a barn (Tr. 164); and $1,200 per month from the rental of her Salt Lake City 
residence (Tr. 45). This evidence would reflect income attributable to Mrs. Muir of $2,920 
per month, not including interest and dividend income which totalled $2,162 in 1989. (Ex. 
25) This is clearly a significant increase in light of the fact that she testified she was earning 
nothing at the time of the entry of the decree. 
The Finding which attempts to justify the court's failure to consider this additional 
income is Finding no. 16 which concludes that the rental on the Salt Lake residence is 
insufficient to pay expenses, thereby resulting in a loss. This finding is not supported by 
either Mrs. Muir's testimony at page 46 of the trial transcript, or Exhibit 26. To the 
contrary, Exhibit 26 which supports the court's Finding no. 17 that Mrs. Muir's monthly 
expenses are $4,701 also includes expenses for the property being rented by her. What the 
court failed to recognize, thus making its Findings clearly erroneous, is that this is a form of 
double credit. Either the income and expenses relating to the Salt Lake residence are both 
included in a determination of Mrs. Muir's financial condition and an ability to meet her own 
financial needs OR both are excluded. The court's exclusion of the rental income for 
purposes of determining Mrs. Muir's monthly income while at the same time considering the 
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expenses she pays as a result of maintaining the property in a determination of her ability to 
meet her monthly obligations is insupportable. 
What the court also failed to consider is whether it was reasonable for Mrs. Muir to 
maintain the Salt Lake residence at all. Although Finding no. 15 purports to address Mrs. 
Muir's failure to sell the residence, which is supported by her testimony at page 179 of the 
trial transcript, there is no finding by the court that Mrs. Muir's efforts at marketing the 
home were reasonable or that her refusal to sell for $185,000 was reasonable. Findings on 
these issues are essential before the court can accept without question Mrs. Muir's claimed 
expenses. 
Finally, although Mrs. Muir did testify in support of Finding no. 18 that she was not 
able to enjoy the amenities which she enjoyed during the marriage, (Tr. 156-160) this is 
testimony which is self-serving and must be analyzed with evidence relating to the standard 
of living and financial ability of Mr. Muir at the time of trial to pay for such luxuries for 
himself and Mrs. Muir. This ability is more specifically addressed below. 
Therefore, the evidence in the record in support of the court's finding that there had 
been no substantial change in Mrs. Muir's financial circumstances is inadequate as a matter 
of law. The weight of evidence establishes that Mrs. Muir's income went from zero at the 
time of the decree to at least $2920 per month at the time of trial on Mr. Muir's petition to 
modify. Although Mrs. Muir claimed expenses of $4700 per month, the court failed to make 
findings as to whether it was reasonable to maintain two residences. From this it is clear 
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that the court's conclusion in Finding no. 19 that there had not been a substantial change in 
Mrs. Muir's financial circumstances is clearly erroneous. 
Similarly, the evidence in support of the court's findings as to Mr. Muir's financial 
condition and his ability to pay alimony is insufficient to support them. The evidence 
includes the following: 
1. Mrs. Muir called her financial expert, Mr. Peterson, whose testimony included 
the following: 
a. That cash from the business would be available to Mr. Muir for 
distribution as additional compensation; (Tr. 120) 
b. That the asset picture of Fairmont Bowl "didn't vary a lot." (Tr. 124) 
c. That the "debt [of Fairmont Bowl] had been coming down." (Tr. 127); 
d. That Mr. Muir's net income had increased $5,000. (Tr. 130, 135); 
e. That the gross receipts of the business had remained more or less the 
same (Tr. 128); and 
f. That Mr. Muir's current wife's earnings came out of the "cash 
account" of Fairmont Bowl to support the family. (Tr. 141). 
2. The financial statements referred to by the court in Finding no. 10, were 
admitted into evidence as Exhibits 6, 7, 8, and 9. 
3. Mr. Bates, Mr. Muir's accountant, testified that cash left in the business would 
be accessible to Mr. Muir as a shareholder to use in his discretion. (Tr. 40) 
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4. Mr. Muir testified that he had some discretion over how to spend his funds, 
but that if he spent them "imprudently" the business would suffer. (Tr. 67) 
5. Mrs. Muir testified that there had been regular upgrades made to the business 
during the marriage. (Tr. 58) 
6. Mr. Muir testified that his vehicle expenses, as well as the premiums for 
automobile and health insurance were paid by the business. (Tr. 107) 
7. Mr. Muir testified that since entry of the decree he had taken one three-day 
trip and one four-day trip to San Diego (Tr. 95), and spent a weekend in Jackson Hole. He 
also testified that he had been in Hong Kong and Thailand in January of 1987 (Tr. 96), and 
took a one-week trip to Europe in November of 1988. (Tr. 97) 
This evidence is insufficient to support the court's findings, especially in light of the 
evidence before the court to the contrary. To begin first with the improvements that had 
been made to Fairmont Bowl, Mr. Muir testified that they were more or less cosmetic in 
nature. (Tr. 65) In fact, Mr. Muir's accountant, Mr. Bates, testified that the fact that 
depreciation was going down indicated that assets were wearing out and not being replaced. 
(Tr. 25, Tr. 29) The depreciation in 1985 was $81,000; in 1990, it had been reduced to 
only $33,000. (Tr. 64) Mr. Muir testified that the physical facility itself was more than 
thirty years old, and that he had done lots of painting, and "some modernizing" as to seating 
and carpets. (Tr. 65) He testified, however, that there had not been any substantial 
replacement of equipment, either lanes, pinsetters, lighting or the roof (Tr. 65) over the last 
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thirty years. Mr. Muir also testified that he planned to replace the lanes in the summer, but 
could not afford to also replace the pinsetters. (Tr. 66) 
Despite the language of Finding no. 9, Mr. Muir testified that there had been "no 
substantial improvements" to the facility (Tr. 75), and also testified that, as to future 
improvement, he would "have to do it in order to stay in business." (Tr. 78) It is clear that 
the improvement Mr. Muir contemplated making to the business were not discretionary, but 
were absolutely necessary to maintain the business as a competitive entity. 
Similarly, there was limited testimony to support the finding that Mr. Muir's received 
substantial benefits from the business. In fact, at the time of the decree, Mr. Muir owned a 
Cottonwood Club membership that had been paid for by the business, at the time of the trial 
on his Petition, he was a member of the Ft. Douglas Country Club at his own personal 
expense. (Tr. 68-69, Tr. 95). At the time of the decree, Mr. Muir's expenses for a Porsche 
911 SC were paid by the business (Tr. 67), as were his vehicle and health insurance 
premiums. (Tr. 107). By the time of the hearing on his Petition, his expenses for his Chevy 
Blazer were paid by the business, as were his vehicle and health insurance premiums. (Tr. 
107) Mr. Muir no longer owned either an airplane or a boat, as he had at the time of the 
decree (Tr. 68), and testified that he would characterize his lifestyle at the time of trial as 
"substantially less" than it had been at the time of the decree of divorce. (Tr. 70) 
As with Mrs. Muir, many of the benefits Mr. Muir enjoyed at the time the parties 
were divorced had been significantly reduced or eliminated altogether, and that was the 
evidence before the court at trial. This was due to the fact that the net income of the 
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business, before compensation to Mr. Muir and before depreciation costs, had gone down 
significantly according to Mr. Bates, the accountant for the business. 
Just as in the court's analysis of the evidence relating to Mrs. Muir's financial 
condition, the findings relating to Mr. Muir's financial condition and ability to pay alimony 
are not supported by the evidence. Its conclusion that there had not been a substantial 
change of circumstances in Mr. Muir's financial condition is clearly erroneous and must be 
vacated. 
Instead, the evidence establishes that there was a material change of circumstances to 
support the lower court's first decision in this case. Specifically, Mr. Muir's income at the 
time of the divorce was $118,577, and this is the income on which his alimony obligation 
was established. His income at the time of the Petition had been reduced to $81,635. The 
net profits of the business, before his compensation, had decreased by approximately 7%, 
due to the increased expenses while gross receipts remained the same. It was necessary and 
not discretionary for Mr. Muir to make substantial improvements to the business to maintain 
it in a competitive condition. Finally, it was clear that neither party was able to maintain the 
standard of living they had enjoyed during the marriage. As a result, the lower court's 
reversal of its earlier decision must be vacated, and at the very least, remanded with specific 
instructions to enter Mr. Muir's supplemental findings and an appropriate order consistent 
therewith. 
Likewise, the evidence in the record is inadequate to support Finding no. 22 and its 
conclusion that Mr. Muir had the ability to assist Mrs. Muir in the payment of attorney's 
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fees. Specifically, the weight of the evidence as to Mrs. Muir's financial needs, her 
earnings, and Mr. Muir's ability to pay is contrary to this finding. It is therefore grossly 
erroneous and must be vacated and remanded with specific instructions to enter an order 
requiring each party to pay their own attorney's fees. 
CONCLUSION 
The lower court's findings and order in this case are fatally defective for two major 
reasons. First, the court failed to make findings mandated by this Court on remand. 
Second, the findings which were made by the court are against the clear weight of the 
evidence. Instead, the record suggests that the lower court interpreted this Court's order on 
remand as an order to simply reverse its earlier decision, rather than make additional 
findings in support of it. Given the lower court's eagerness to enter Mrs. Muir's proposed 
findings and order, and its failure to comply with this Court's mandate on remand, this Court 
should vacate the lower court's decision and enter its own order after consideration of both 
parties' motions submitted after remand and Mr. Muir's objections to Mrs. Muir's proposed 
findings. Then, this case should be once again remanded, but only for the sole purpose of 
requiring the lower court to enter Mr. Muir's supplemental findings and an appropriate 
order. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 13th day of July, 1994. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant. 
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DIVORCE 30-3-5 
30-3-4.1 to 30-3-4.4. Repealed. 
Repeals. — Laws 1990, ch. 230, § 4 repeals authority, duties, and jurisdiction of court com-
these sections, as last amended by L. 1989, ch. missioners, effective April 23, 1990. 
104, §§ 2 to 5, providing for the appointment, 
30-3-5. Disposition of property — Maintenance and health 
care of parties and children — Division of debts 
— Court to have continuing jurisdiction — Cus-
tody and visitation — Termination of alimony — 
Nonmeritorious petition for modification — Meri-
torious petition for modification [Effective until 
January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is available at a reasonable cost, an order requiring the 
purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for the dependent children; and 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which p^rty is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, hecessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations ior debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the COUH shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
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the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouSe 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorney's fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order 
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
Disposition of property — Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children — Division of 
debts — Court to have continuing jurisdiction — 
Custody and visitation — Termination of alimony 
— Nonmeritorious petition for modification [Ef-
fective January 1, 1994]. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equita-
ble orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations, and parties. 
The court shall include the following in every decree of divorce: 
(a) an order assigning responsibility for the payment of reasonable and 
necessary medical and dental expenses of the dependent children; 
(b) if coverage is or becomes available at a reasonable cost, an order 
requiring the purchase and maintenance of appropriate health, hospital, 
and dental care insurance for the dependent children; 
(c) pursuant to Section 15-4-6.5: 
(i) an order specifying which party is responsible for the payment 
of joint debts, obligations, or liabilities of the parties contracted or 
incurred during marriage; 
(ii) an order requiring the parties to notify respective creditors or 
obligees, regarding the court's division of debts, obligations, or liabil-
ities and regarding the parties' separate, current addresses; and 
(iii) provisions for the enforcement of these orders; 
(d) provisions for income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, 
Chapter 11, Parts 4 and 5; and 
(e) with regard to child support orders issued or modified on or after 
January 1, 1994, that are subject to income withholding, an order assess-
ing against the obligor an additional $7 per month check processing fee to 
be included in the amount withheld and paid to the Office of Recovery 
Services within the Department of Human Services for the purposes of 
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income withholding in accordance with Title 62A, Chapter 11, Parts 4 
and 5. 
(2) The court may include, in an order determining child support, an order 
assigning financial responsibility for all or a portion of child care expenses 
incurred on behalf of the dependent children, necessitated by the employment 
or training of the custodial parent. If the court determines that the circum-
stances are appropriate and that the dependent children would be adequately 
cared for, it may include an order allowing the noncustodial parent to provide 
the day care for the dependent children, necessitated by the employment or 
training of the custodial parent. 
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to make subsequent changes or 
new orders for the support and maintenance of the parties, the custody of the 
children and their support, maintenance, health, and dental care, or the dis-
tribution of the property and obligations for debts as is reasonable and neces-
sary. 
(4) In determining visitation rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
members of the immediate family, the court shall consider the best interest of 
the child. 
(5) Unless a decree of divorce specifically provides otherwise, any order of 
the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse automatically termi-
nates upon the remarriage of that former spouse. However, if the remarriage 
is annulled and found to be void ab initio, payment of alimony shall resume if 
the party paying alimony is made a party to the action of annulment and his 
rights are determined. 
(6) Any order of the court that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
terminates upon establishment by the party paying alimony that the former 
spouse is residing with a person of the opposite sex. However, if it is further 
established by the person receiving alimony that that relationship or associa-
tion is without any sexual contact, payment of alimony shall resume. 
(7) If a petition for modification of child custody or visitation provisions of a 
court order is made and denied, the court shall order the petitioner to pay the 
reasonable attorneys' fees expended by the prevailing party in that action, if 
the court determines that the petition was without merit and not asserted or 
defended against in good faith. 
(8) If a petition alleges substantial noncompliance with a visitation order 
by a parent, a grandparent, or other member of the immediate family pursu-
ant to Section 78-32-12.2 where a visitation right has been previously granted 
by the court, the court may award to the prevailing party costs, including 
actual attorney fees and court costs incurred by the prevailing party because 
of the other party's failure to provide or exercise court-ordered visitation. 
History: R.S. 1898 & C.L. 1907, § 1212; L. or obligations" in the introductory paragraph 
1909, ch. 109, § 4; C.L. 1917, § 3000; R.S. of Subsection (1), added Subsection (lKc), and 
1933 & C. 1943, 40-3-5; L. 1969, ch. 72, § 3; inserted "and obligations for debts" near the 
1975, ch. 81, § 1; 1979, ch. 110, § 1; 1984, ch. end of Subsection (3). 
13, § 1; 1985, ch. 72, § 1; 1985, ch. 100, § 1; The 1993 amendment by ch. 152, effective 
1991, ch. 257, § 4; 1993, ch. 152, § 1; 1993, May 3, 1993, substituted "members of the im-
ch. 261, § 1. mediate family" for "relatives" and "best inter-
Amended effective January 1, 1994. — est" for "welfare" in Subsection (4); substituted 
Laws 1993, ch. 261, § 1 amends this section "shall" for "may" and inserted "or defended 
effective January 1, 1994. See the amendment against" in Subsection (7); added Subsection 
note below. (8); and made stylistic changes. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1991 amend- The 1993 amendment by ch. 261, effective 
ment,, effective April 29, 1991, inserted "debts January 1, 1994, inserted "or becomes" in Sub-
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Compensation Act is to provide financial 
security to the injured employee during the 
period of disability. State Tax Comm'n v. 
Industrial Comm'n, 685 P.2d 1051, 1053 (Utah 
1984); Wilstead v. Industrial Comm'n, 17 Utah 
2d 214, 407 P.2d 692, 693 (Utah 1965); 
Crosland v. Board of Review, 828 P.2d 528, 
530 (Utah App. 1992). This purpose has no 
application in the case of inmates, because their 
financial security does not change with the 
occurrence of a disability. An inmate's earning 
capacity is already diminished by virtue of his or 
her incarceration. Further, the inmate does not 
depend on his or her ability to work to provide 
food, shelter, or medical care. These are 
provided by the prison system regardless of 
ability to work. 
Workers' compensation is centered on the 
relationship between employer and employee. 
The "essence of a workers' compensation system 
is that it is a mutual arrangement of reciprocal 
rights between an employer and employee 
whereby both parties give up and gain certain 
advantages/ Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 
P.2d 678, 679 (Utah 1985). Although prisoners 
may participate in various types of prison work 
programs, this participation does not create the 
same "mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights'' 
upon which the workers' compensation system 
is based. The primary purpose of the association 
between the prison system and the inmate is 
incarceration, not employment. Franks, 7 F.3d 
at 972. 
In light of these purposes, we hold that 
inmates were not afforded employee status under 
the Workers' Compensation Act previous to the 
amendment. Thus the amendment excluding 
inmates from the statutory definition of 
"employee" is a clarification, not a change, and 
should be applied retroactively. Accordingly, 
Kofoed is not entitled to workers' compensation 
benefits and we affirm the decision of the 
Industrial Commission. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Pamela T. Greenwood, Judge 
I CONCUR IN THE RESULT: 
Gregory K. Orme, Judge 
Cite as 
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This opinion is subject to revision before 
publication in the Pacific Reporter. 
JACKSON, Judge: 
Oneida Cold Storage and Warehouse, Inc. 
(Oneida) challenges the trial court's dismissal of 
breach of contract, breach of warranty, and 
negligence claims against Metalclad Insulation 
Corporation (Metalclad). Oneida specifically 
disputes the findings of fact upon which the trial 
court based its dismissal. Because Oneida has 
failed to marshal all the evidence in support of 
those findings, we refuse to consider its 
challenge and summarily affirm the trial court's 
dismissal. 
BACKGROUND2 
In 1981 Roth Company (Roth) contracted to 
design and build the shell of a cold storage 
warehouse in Salt Lake City, Utah for 
Oneida/SLIC (SLIC). In connection with the 
development of the warehouse, SLIC entered 
into a lease agreement with Oneida, under which 
Oneida agreed to lease approximately 65,000 
square feet of warehouse space. As part of the 
lease agreement, Oneida agreed to supply all 
insulation and vapor barrier materials necessary 
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for construction of the warehouse's insulated 
areas. 
To fulfill its lease obligation, Oneida entered 
into two separate contracts with Metalclad, 
under which Metalclad agreed to supply the 
insulation materials to be used for the warehouse 
and to supervise the installation of those 
materials. 
Oneida filed a third-party complaint against 
Metalclad to recover damages resulting from 
defects in the warehouse's insulated concrete 
floor slab system.3 The concrete floor cracked, 
buckled, and broke up, both during and after 
construction. Oneida claimed that Metalclad had 
breached express and implied warranties relating 
to the floor insulation that Metalclad had 
supplied. 
The trial court found that Oneida failed to 
prove Metalclad had breached either of the 
contracts or had breached express and implied 
warranties relating to the insulation products. 
The trial court also found that Oneida failed to 
prove Metalclad was involved in designing the 
floor slab system. Finally, the trial court found 
that Oneida failed to prove Metalclad negligently 
caused or contributed to the damages which 
Oneida sustained. Accordingly, the trial court 
dismissed all of Oneida's claims against 
Metalclad. Oneida now appeals that dismissal. 
APPELLANT'S FAILURE TO MARSHAL 
THE EVIDENCE 
Oneida presents six issues in its brief, four of 
which are indisputably issues of fact and two of 
which Oneida characterizes as issues of law. 
The first issue that Oneida characterizes as one 
of law challenges the trial court's denial of 
damages resulting from alleged breaches of 
contract and warranties. The trial court's denial 
of Oneida's claim for damages, however, simply 
followed its finding that Metalclad did not 
breach its contracts or warranties. The second 
issue that Oneida characterizes as one of law 
challenges the trial court's ruling that Metalclad 
was not jointly liable with Roth. The trial 
court's determination that Metalclad was not 
jointly liable, once again, simply followed its 
finding that Metalclad was not negligent. In 
other words, the trial court's dismissal of 
Metalclad's damages and liability claims resulted 
from the trial court's findings of fact and not 
from its application, interpretation, or choice of 
law. Thus despite Oneida's characterization, all 
the issues presented on appeal dispute the trial 
court's findings of fact. 
Utah appellate courts do not take trial courts' 
factual findings lightly. We repeatedly have set 
forth the heavy burden appellants must bear 
when challenging factual findings. To 
successfully appeal a trial court's findings of 
fact, appellate counsel must play the devil's 
advocate. "[Attorneys) must extricate 
[themselves] from the client's shoes and fully 
assume the adversary's position. In order to 
properly discharge the [marshaling] duty . . . , 
the challenger must present, in comprehensive 
and fastidious order, every scrap of competent 
evidence introduced at trial which supports the 
very findings the appellant resists." West Valley 
Gty v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 1315 
(Utah App. 1991); accord In re Estate of 
Bartell, 776 P.2d 885. 886 (Utah 1989); State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987); 
Commercial Union Assocs. v. Clayton, 863 P.2d 
29, 36 (Utah App. 1993); Online Corp. v. 
Granite Mill, 849 P.2d 602, 604 (Utah App. 
1993). Once appellants have established every 
pillar supporting their adversary's position, they 
then "must ferret out a fatal flaw in the 
evidence" and show why those pillars fail to 
support the trial court's findings. West Valley 
Gty, 818 P.2d at 1314. They must show the 
trial court's findings are "so lacking in support 
as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly 
erroneous.'" Bartell, 776 P.2d at 886 (quoting 
Walker, 743 P.2d at 193). 
This rigorous standard reflects the doctrine 
that appellate courts "do not sit to retry cases 
submitted on disputed facts." Bartell, 776 P.2d 
at 886. Accordingly, "[w]hen the duty to 
marshal is not properly discharged, we refuse to 
consider the merits of challenges to the findings 
and accept the findings as valid." Mountain 
States Broadcasting Co. v. Neale, 783 P.2d551, 
553 (Utah App. 1989). 
Oneida has failed to marshal the evidence in 
support of the trial court's factual findings. 
Rather than bearing its marshaling burden, 
Oneida has merely presented carefully selected 
facts and excerpts of trial testimony in support 
of its position. Such selective citation to the 
record does not begin to marshal the evidence; 
it is nothing more than an attempt to reargue the 
case before this court—a tactic that we reject. 
Commercial Union, 863 P.2dat36; Online, 849 
P.2d at 604. Because Oneida has failed to 
marshal the evidence supporting the trial court's 
findings, we hold that those findings are 
accurate and affirm the trial court's dismissal 
based on those findings. 
As we decline to consider the merits of 
Oneida's appeal, we take the occasion to further 
articulate our rationale behind the marshaling 
requirement. We recognize that requiring 
appellants who challenge trial courts' factual 
findings first to marshal all the evidence in 
support of those findings and second to 
demonstrate why that evidence remains 
insufficient to support those findings is a 
rigorous standard. Nonetheless, this strict 
requirement both grows from and nurtures two 
interrelated court objectives: efficiency and 
fairness. 
The deference we afford to trial courts' 
findings is based on and fosters the principle 
that traditional fact finders, whether judges or 
juries, are better equipped to consider, weigh, 
and assess the evidence that litigants bring 
before the courts. Efficient resolution of disputes 
demands that, unless the facts found by the trial 
court are clearly erroneous, they will be upheld 
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on appeal. In short, "[w]e do not sit to retry the 
facts/ Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 817 P.2d 
789, 800 (Utah 1991). Successful challenges to 
findings of fact thus must demonstrate to 
appellate courts first how the trial court found 
the facts from the evidence and second why such 
findings contradict the weight of the evidence. 
These demonstrations in appellants' briefs not 
only avoid retrying the facts but also assist us in 
our decision-making and opinion-writing, thus 
increasing our efficiency. 
Additionally, the deference we afford to trial 
courts' factual findings is based on and fosters 
the principle that appellants rather than appellees 
bear the greater burden on appeal. When 
appellants do not marshal the evidence in 
support of disputed findings, they place 
appellees or respondents in a precarious 
position. Prudent appellees likely will not rely 
solely on an assertion that the appellant has 
failed to marshal the evidence; rather, appellees 
are compelled to perform the marshaling process 
to protect their position. In short, appellees are 
constrained to do the appellant's work, usually 
at considerable time and expense.4 When 
appellants challenge findings of fact, fairness 
requires that they bear the costs of 
demonstrating how the trial court found those 
facts from the evidence and why those findings 
contradict the weight of the evidence. The 
marshaling requirement, therefore, enhances 
both fairness and efficiency as appellate courts 
hear appeals of trial court rulings. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Oneida has failed to marshal the 
evidence in support of the factual findings which 
it disputes, we decline to reach the merits of its 
appeal. We hold that the trial court's findings of 
fact are accurate, and accordingly we affirm the 
trial court's dismissal of Oneida's claims against 
Me talc lad. 
Norman H. Jackson, Judge 
WE CONCUR: 
James Z. Davis, Judge 
Regnal W. Garff, Judge 
1. Senior Judge Regnal W. Garff, acting pursuant to 
appointment under Utah Code Ann. §78-3-24(10) 
(1992). 
2. The parties do not dispute the following statement 
of the case. 
3. SLIC filed the original complaint against Roth for 
breach of contract, negligence, and breach of 
warranties. At trial the court entered a judgment 
against Roth for $1,909,401.57plus interest and costs. 
Roth does not appeal that judgment. 
4. In the instant case, Metalclad's attorneys admirably 
marshalled the evidence to protect their client on 
appeal. That evidence supports the trial court's 
findings. 
Cite as 
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BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Lorna B. Moore appeals from the trial court's 
order granting Roy B. Moore's petition to 
modify the parties' divorce decree. Principally, 
Mrs. Moore complains that the trial court erred 
in rinding a substantial change in her material 
circumstances and in reducing her alimony 
award from $1050 per month to one dollar per 
month three years after the filing of the present 
action. Mr. Moore has filed a cross-appeal 
claiming the court erred in continuing alimony 
at $1050 per month for three years. We reverse 
and remand for reinstatement of the original 
alimony award. 
FACTS 
The parties were married in Elko, Nevada, on 
March 25, 1964, and had three children during 
the course of their sixteen-year marriage. All 
three children have reached majority. In 1980, 
the parties entered into a stipulation and 
property settlement agreement, which became 
the basis for a divorce decree entered on 
December 23, 1980. At the time of the divorce, 
the parties had an adjusted gross income of 
$40,996, the majority of which was Mr. 
Moore's income as Mrs. Moore was employed 
part-time for five dollars an hour. At the time 
the decree was entered, the parties had discussed 
Mrs. Moore's plan to recertify as # school 
teacher or to obtain a master's degree in 
sociology. 
Pursuant to the decree, Mr. Moore was 
required to pay $1150 per month in alimony 
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ing, the Utah Supreme Court observed that 
"[e]very parent has the duty to support the 
children he has brought into the world. 
This duty is inalienable and he cannot rid 
himself of it by purporting to transfer it to 
someone else, by contract or otherwise." 4 
Id. at 128-29. Sentry relies on this state-
ment, and the Gulley court's further obser-
vation that 
the just and logical consequence of the 
duty of parents to support their children 
is that if they are left in need and a third 
party provides them necessities, he is 
subrogated to the child's right and may 
obtain reimbursement therefor. 
Id. 
Sentry's reliance on Gulley is, however, 
misguided because in Gulley, the court 
clearly reasoned that recovery against the 
father for necessities provided to his chil-
dren by a third party was permissible be-
cause the father's failure to pay on-going 
child support as specified in the divorce 
decree left the children "in need." See 
Gulley, 570 P.2d at 129. See also id. 
(Wilkins, J., dissenting) (pointing out that 
state's theory was that father had failed to 
pay child support "as ordered in the de-
cree "). Moreover, the ex-husband's liabili-
ty was limited to the amount of monthly 
child support which was specified in the 
decree. See 570 P.2d at 129. Gulley, then, 
has no application to cases involving a non-
custodial parent's obligation to pay for nec-
essities provided to his children, except as 
to parents who have not paid their child 
support as ordered. 
In this case, Sentry never even addressed 
the extent of defendant's child support obli-
gation. Nor does Sentry make any conten-
tion that defendant's child support obli-
gation has not been fulfilled in accordance 
with the divorce decree. Thus, the princi-
ples enunciated in Gulley have no applica-
tion to the present case. 
4. In Gulley, the children's mother and father 
divorced, and the decree of divorce awarded 
custody of the parties' four children to their 
mother, together with $50 per month support 
for each child and $50 per month for alimony. 
After several years of making regular support 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment 
appealed from is affirmed. 
BENCH and BILLINGS, JJ., concur. 
Marita MUIR, Plaintiff and Appellant, 
v. 
Michael D. MUIR, Defendant 
and Appellee. 
No. 900603-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 12, 1992. 
Former husband brought motion to 
modify alimony he was required to pay 
former wife. The Third District Court," 
Salt Lake County, Homer F. Wilkinson, J^ 
entered order modifying parties' decree of 
divorce and reducing amount husband was 
required to pay from $1,500 to $900 I 
month and ordered husband to pay $3,000 
of wife's attorney fees. Wife appealed; 
The Court of Appeals, Garff, J., held that 
(1) remand was required to enable trill 
court to make specific findings in regardi 
to husband's income from closely held cor* 
poration, and (2) trial court abused its dtf 
cretion in reducing attorney's fees payabli 
to wife from a sum of more than $15,000 w 
$3,000 without a finding that the reductioi 
was warranted, requiring remand. 
Remanded. 
1. Divorce <S=>164 
Trial court has discretion to modfa 
divorce decree after it has determined tig 
payments, the father entered into an agreeing 
with the mother whereby he agreed to P t f * J 
$10,000, which was to be prepayment of MM 
his obligations under the decree, in re^rnSS 
release of those obligations. See Gullefi&n 
R2d at 128. 
A - - * 
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there has been substantial change of mate-
rial circumstances subsequent to the de-
cree, not contemplated at time of decree. 
2. Divorce <s»239 
When a spouse owns a closely held 
corporation, including a professional corpo-
ration, trial court must do mor^ than rely 
only on spouse's stated income when deter-
mining the spouse's ability to pay alimony. 
3. Divorce <3=>245(2) 
Temporary increase or decrease in pay-
or's income does not necessarily constitute 
substantial change in circumstances, for 
purposes of modification of divorce decree. 
4. Divorce <s=»245(2) 
Finding that assets of marriage had 
been divided equally upon divorce was rele-
vant on motion to modify alimony payable 
under divorce decree to extent it estab-
lished baseline from which court could de-
termine whether substantial change had oc-
curred. 
5. Divorce <s=>245(2) 
Finding of increase in wife's income 
and decrease in husband's income, without 
more specificity, does not necessarily sup-
port conclusion of substantial change in 
circumstances, for purposes of petition to 
modify alimony payable under divorce de-
cree. 
6. Divorce ®=>287 
Remand was required to enable trial 
court to make adequate findings, supported 
by sufficient evidence, regarding whether 
material circumstances of parties had sub-
stantially changed in ways not contemplat-
ed by original divorce decree such that 
modification of decree could be warranted, 
where court had not made sufficient inter-
mediary findings before making a bottom 
•foe finding regarding husband's income, in 
that husband was involved in closely held 
corporation and court did not explain why 
kttsband's income significantly decreased 
Wen his ownership in business increased, 
•M court did not consider evidence that 
**poration substantially reduced its liabili-
£*» o r whether husband benefitted beyond 
* w y earned from corporation. 
MUIR Utah 737 
(UtahApp. 1992) 
7. Divorce <s=>223 
District court has discretion to order 
either party to pay other party's attorney 
fees in divorce action, including fees in-
curred in modification proceedings and in 
appeals. U.C.A.1953, 30-3-3. 
8. Divorce <s=*224 
In order to award attorney fees in di-
vorce action, trial court must find request-
ing party is in need of financial assistance, 
requested fees are reasonable, and other 
spouse has ability to pay. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-3. 
9. Divorce <S=>227(1), 287 
Trial court abused its discretion in re-
ducing attorney's fees payable to wife from 
a sum of more than $15,000 to $3,000 with-
out a finding that the reduction was war-
ranted, requiring remand. U.C.A.1953, 30-
3-3. 
Suzanne Marelius (argued), Littlefield & 
Peterson, Salt Lake City, for plaintiff and 
appellant. 
Duane H. Gillman, Leslie J. Randolph 
(argued), McDowell & Gillman, P.C., Mary 
J. Woodhead, Watkiss & Saperstein, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellee. 
Before GARFF, JACKSON and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
GARFF, Judge: 
Appellant Marita Muir (Wife) appeals an 
order modifying the parties' decree of di-
vorce. The modification reduced appellee 
Michael D. Muir's (Husbanjl) obligation to 
pay alimony from $1,500 to $900 a month. 
The modification also ordered Husband to 
pay $3,000 of Wife's attorney fees, which 
amounted to approximately $15,000. We 
reverse and remand. 
FACTS 
The parties were married for more than 
twenty years before their divorce on Sep-
tember 16, 1985. At the time of the modifi-
A-0 
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cation hearing, five years later, all three of 
the parties' children had attained majority. 
At the time of the divorce, the court 
found, pursuant to the parties' stipulation, 
that each party had received an equal prop-
erty distribution. The distribution provid-
ed that Husband would receive all the com-
mon stock owned by the parties in Fair-
mont Bowl and that Wife would receive the 
parties' residence. The court ordered Hus-
band to assume liability for loans incurred 
by Fairmont Bowl and it ordered Wife to 
assume the mortgage debt on the resi-
dence. 
The court ordered Husband to pay Wife 
alimony of $1,500 per month "until [Hus-
band's] obligation . . . is terminated be-
cause of the death of one of the parties, the 
remarriage or cohabitation by [Wife] or 
because of further order of the court based 
on some other valid and lawful reason to 
terminate alimony pursuant to the laws of 
the state of Utah." The court ordered each 
party to pay his or her attorney fees and 
costs "resulting from and incident to this 
action." 
During most of the parties' marriage, 
and at the time of the divorce, Husband 
derived all of his income from his majority 
ownership of Fairmont Bowl. At the time 
of the divorce, he owned 78% of the compa-
ny's stock, with the remainder held by his 
father. Since the divorce, Husband's own-
ership increased to 96.61%, as a result of 
gifts of stock from his father. The parties' 
children own the remaining stock. 
In August 1989, five years after the di-
vorce, Husband petitioned for modification 
of the alimony order, claiming a substantial 
change in material circumstances since en-
try of the decree. He sought a reduction 
in alimony for one year, followed by com-
plete termination. 
Husband based his petition for modifica-
tion on a claim that, since the divorce, his 
income had decreased and Wife's income 
had increased. Specifically, Husband 
claimed that while gross revenues of his 
business had remained consistent, expenses 
had increased, depreciation had decreased, 
and his business needed extensive capital 
investment. 
Husband also claimed Wife's income hid 
substantially increased since the time ef 
the divorce. He presented evidence shoiK 
ing that her income from her seasonal^ 
as a flight attendant averaged $1,400 g r S 
per month in the first nine months of 199(1 
At trial, Husband's accountant testified 
that Husband had total discretion overttf 
amount of money he took as compensate 
each year. Wife's accountant testified that 
Husband's calculations were misleading 
Wife's accountant also testified thatHtt3 
band received benefits in addition to hto 
stated salary including automobile tfe 
penses, travel expenses, health insui*nca| 
auto insurance, costs, country club costL 
and tax deferred benefits including pensQ 
contributions. Husband also benefitted 
from the fact that his new wife drew t^f 
salary from the corporation. ' , f t^ 
At trial, the court permitted Wife's attOfi 
ney to proffer testimony regarding thi 
amount and reasonableness of attornqr 
fees. Husband's attorney did not object' 
The proffer included itemizations and alfl-
davits of Wife's former attorneys. Wife's 
attorney proffered that total fees and coftl 
incurred in defending the petition for modt 
fication were $13,179, along with estimated 
trial fees of $2,600. She then concluded 
her proffer: "I have been a practicing it* 
torney for ten years in this area. And that 
the rate I am charging is commensurate' 
with my experience and expertise in the 
field." Again, Husband's attorney did not 
object nor did he cross-examine Wife's a | 
torney. Wife's attorney requested leave w 
supplement the record with a final item!** 
tion of the trial fees. Husband's attorney 
proffered fees of $6,000 for the modifica-
tion action. 
In October 1990, the trial court concluded 
there had been a substantial change to 
material circumstances justifying modificar 
tion of the original alimony award, To* 
court based its conclusion on the following 
findings: (1) the assets of the marriage had 
been divided equally; (2) Wife's annual to* 
come had increased from $12,000 to f l y 
000; (3) Husband's annual income 
creased from $118,600 to $81,600; 
hadd* 
and (4) 
A ^ 
MUIR 
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Husband needed to reinvest in the busi-
ness: 
[Husband] in the near future is 
going to have to put Some big—well, 
some money into his business in order to 
stay up with the competition. 
The court then found: 
[Wife] has incurred substantial legal 
fees approximating $15,000 for her repre-
sentation in these proceedings. [Hus-
band] has incurred legal fees for repre-
sentation in these proceeding of $6,000. 
The Court further concludes that 
[Husband] should be required to pay his 
own attorney's fees in these proceedings 
and that he should also be required to 
pay to [Wife] for the use and benefit of 
her counsel in the matter the sum of 
$3,000. 
Wife appals, claiming the court erred in 
determining there had been a substantial 
change in material circumstances because 
the underlying findings were inadequate 
and erroneous. She also claims the court 
abused its discretion in awarding a sub-
itantially smaller attorney fee than that 
requested. We reverse and remand. 
MODIFICATION OF ALIMONY 
[1] A trial court has discretion to modi-
fy a divorce decree after it has determined 
that there has been a substantial change of 
material circumstances subsequent to the 
decree, not contemplated at the time of the 
decree. Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah App.1989), cert dismissed, 795 P.2d 
1139 (Utah 1990); Woodward v. Wood-
ward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per 
curiam). 
We first consider whether the findings 
adequately support the determination that 
there has been a substantial change in ma-
terial circumstances. In this regard, "the 
trial court must make findings on all mate-
rial issues, and its failure to delineate what 
circumstances have changed and why these 
changes support the modification made in 
the prior divorce decree constitutes revers-
ible error unless the facts in the record are 
dear, uncontroverted and only support the 
Judgment." Whitehouse v. Whitehouse, 
790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah App.1990); accord 
. MUIR Utah 739 
6 (UtahApp. 1992) 
Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987); Throckmorton v. Throckmorton, 
767 P.2d 121, 124 (Utah App.1988); Utah 
R.Civ.P. 52(a). Further, findings "should 
be sufficiently detailed and include enough 
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by 
which the ultimate conclusion on each fac-
tual issue was reached." Acton, 737 P.2d 
at 999; accord, Gardner v. Gardner, 748 
P.2d 1076, 1078 (Utah 1988) (quoting Ruck-
er v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336, 1338 (Utah 
1979)); Whitehouse, 790 P.2d at 61. 
CLOSELY-HELD CORPORATIONS 
Determining Husband's income is com-
plex because he derives his income from a 
closely-held corporation. 
[2] This court and the supreme court 
have held that when a spouse owns a close-
ly-held corporation, including a professional 
corporation, a trial court must do more 
than rely only on the spouse's stated in-
come. See, e.g., Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 
1072, 1076 (Utah 1985); Christiansen v. 
Christiansen, 667 P.2d 592, 594 (Utah 
1983). 
In order to determine whether the 
court's findings were adequate, we consid-
er what constitutes "all material issues." 
Obviously, all material issues must relate 
to "a substantial change of circumstances 
subsequent to the decree, that was not 
originally contemplated within the decree 
itself," Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 
(Utah App.1989) (citing Woodward v. 
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) 
(per curiam)), and "must relate to the basis 
upon which the original award was made 
by the trial court." Id. at 1251-52. 
Because of the nature of alimony, the 
substantial change goes to financial and 
property interests and circumstances of the 
parties. Montoya v. Montoya, 696 P.2d 
1193, 1194-95 (Utah 1985). 
[3] A temporary increase or decrease in 
the payor's income does not necessarily 
constitute a substantial change. English 
v. English, 565 P.2d 409, 412 (Utah 1977) 
(substantial change does not occur when 
party "experiences unusual prosperity dur-
f\-\D 
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ing one year"). Nor does a temporary 
change in the payee's income necessarily 
constitute a substantial change.- Ring v. 
Ring, 29 Utah 2d 436, 511 P.2d 155, 159 
(Utah 1973); Felt v. Felt, 27 Utah 2d 103, 
493 P.2d 620, 624 (1972). 
For example, in Jones, the supreme court 
held the trial court erred in considering 
only the husband's stated income. 700 
P.2d at 1076. The trial court should have 
considered that the husband "had control 
over the entire profit, but chose to take 
only half of it as personal income and to set 
the rest aside for reinvestment in the busi-
ness." Id. The court noted the proper 
balance between the need to reinvest in the 
business and the need to pay alimony: 
If these capital needs [of the business] 
are a result of discretionary decisions of 
the husband to expand and improve the 
business, rather than to maintain it in its 
present condition, then to permit him to 
divert income into the business at the 
expense of his ex-spouse's support needs 
would be to permit him to enrich himself 
at her expense. 
Id. In Christiansen, the court held that 
"where an ex-husband has a wholly-owned 
corporation, a trial court may consider both 
his individual income and the corporation's 
income in considering a petition by the di-
vorced wife for modification of alimony and 
child support." 667 P.2d at 594. The 
Christiansen court affirmed a finding that 
the payor benefitted more than his stated 
corporate salary indicated. Id. The court 
affirmed a finding that the payor benefit-
ted personally from expenditures of the 
business for an employee benefit program 
and auto allowance. Id. at 593-94; see 
also, Naylor v. Naylor, 700 P.2d 707, 709 
(Utah 1985) (trial court correctly considered 
benefits to payor such as bonuses, pension 
contributions, and profit-sharing accounts); 
Hinckley v. Hinckley, 815 P.2d 1352, 1354 
(Utah App.1991) (court "not bound by [busi-
ness owner's] allocation of business income 
in determining whether he is still able to 
pay alimony."). 
Trial courts may consider many factors 
when evaluating a business owner's in-
come, see, e.g., Sorensen v. Sorensen, 839 
P.2d 774, 777 (Utah 1992) (accounts receiva-
bles may be used to pay alimony); Naylor, 
700 P.2d at 709 (may consider corporate 
benefits such as bonuses, pension contribu-
tions, and profit-sharing accounts); En-
glish, 565 P.2d at 412 (may consider busi-
ness owner's historical earning ability to 
determine income); Rasband v. Rasband, 
752 P.2d 1331, 1333 (Utah App.1988) (may 
upwardly adjust husband's stated income 
because of "his ability to expense some 
personal use items through his business."). 
Here, the court made four findings to 
support its conclusion that there had been a 
substantial change in material circum-
stances: (1) the assets of the marriage had 
been divided equally; (2) Wife's income had 
increased; (3) Husband's income had de-
creased; and (4) Husband needed to rein-
vest in the business. 
[4] The first finding does not relate di-
rectly to a substantial change. However, it 
is relevant to the extent it establishes a 
baseline from which the court can deter-
mine whether a substantial change has oc-
curred. See, e.g., Higley v. Higley, 676 
P.2d 379, 382 n. 1 (Utah 1983). 
[5] The next two findings relate direct-
ly to a substantial change in circumstances. 
But these findings, of an increase in Wife's 
income and a decrease in Husband's in-
come, without more specificity, do not nec-
essarily support a conclusion of a substan-
tial change in circumstances. See, e.g., 
Ring, 511 P.2d at 159; Felt, 493 P.2d at 
624. 
[6] In a case such as this, where Hus-
band's finances and the finances of the 
business are intertwined, a bottom line 
finding regarding Husband's income does 
not "include enough subsidiary facts to dis-
close the steps by which the court's ulti-
mate conclusions were reached." White-
house v. Whitehouse, 790 P.2d 57, 61 (Utah 
App.1990). For example, some important 
subsidiary facts the court should have con-
sidered include: why Husband's income 
significantly decreased when his ownership 
in the business increased by eighteen per-
cent; evidence that the company substan-
A ll 
MUIR 
Cite as 841 P-2d " 
tially reduced its liabilities in 1988; evi-
dence of Husband's net worth statements 
in credit applications made since the decree; 
and, testimony regarding "loans to share-
holders" on the books of the business 
amounting to cash not included in Hus-
band's compensation. 
The trial court also failed to find whether 
Husband benefitted beyond the salary 
earned from the closely-held corporation. 
The record indicates that Husband received 
travel and auto allowances, auto and life 
insurance, tax deferred benefits including 
pension contributions, and that his new 
wife drew a salary from the corporation. 
See Naylor, 700 P.2d at 709. As in Chris-
tiansen, any such expenses paid by the 
corporation should be added to the stated 
salary.1 Christiansen, 667 P.2d at 593. 
Obviously, all of these "business expenses" 
contributed to the bowling alley's de-
creased profitability since the divorce. 
The finding that Husband would soon 
need to reinvest in the business is proble-
matic because the court failed to find 
whether the reinvestment constituted a 
"discretionary decision . . . to expand and 
improve" or whether the reinvestment was 
to "maintain it in its present condition." 
Jones, 700 P.2d at 1076. 
Accordingly, we remand for the trial 
court to enter adequate findings, supported 
by sufficient evidence, regarding whether 
the material circumstances of these parties 
have or have not substantially changed in 
ways not contemplated by the original de-
cree such that modification of the decree 
may be warranted.2 
ATTORNEY FEES 
Wife claims the court abused its discre-
tion in awarding only $3,000 in attorney 
fees when the amount proffered was much 
greater. 
1. We do not suggest that the new wife's income 
should be added to Husband's stated salary. 
However, the new wife's income most likely 
relieves Husband of a portion of his stated ex-
penses. 
2. In the event the trial court on remand deter-
mines there has been a substantial change in 
material circumstances not contemplated by the 
decree, the court must then make specific and 
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[7] The district court has discretion to 
order either party to pay the other party's 
attorney fees in a divorce action. Utah 
Code Ann. § 30-3-3 (1989); Maughan v. 
Maughan, 770 P.2d 156, 162 (Utah App. 
1989). Section 30-3-3 includes attorney 
fees incurred in modification proceedings 
and in appeals. See Maughan, 770 P.2d at 
162. 
[8] In order to award attorney fees, the 
trial court must find (1) the requesting 
party is in need of financial assistance; (2) 
the requested fees are reasonable; and (3) 
the other spouse has the ability to pay. 
Crouse v. Crouse, 817 P.2d 836, 840 (Utah 
App.1991); Haumont v. Haumont, 793 
P.2d 421, 425 (Utah App.1990); Riche v. 
Ricke, 784 P.2d 465, 470 (Utah App. 1989). 
In determining the reasonableness of at-
torney fees, the court may consider 
the difficulty of the litigation, the effi-
ciency of the attorneys in presenting the 
case, the reasonableness of the number 
of hours spent on the case, the fee cus-
tomarily charged in the locality for simi-
lar services, the amount involved in the 
case and the result attained, and the 
expertise and experience of the attorneys 
involved. 
Rasband v. Rasband, 752 P.2d 1331, 1336 
(Utah App. 1988) (quoting Cabrera v. Cott-
rell, 694 P.2d 622, 625 (Utah 1985)). 
[9] Where "the evidence supporting the 
reasonableness of requested attorney fees 
is both adequate and entirely undisputed, 
. . . the court abuses its discretion in 
awarding less than the amount requested 
unless the reduction is warranted" by one 
or more of the established factors. Mar-
tindale v. Adams, 111 P.2d 514, 517-18 
(Utah App.1989). 
adequate findings reflecting the English factors 
to support a modification of the alimony award. 
That is the court must make findings regarding 
(1) Wife's ability to provide for herself the stan-
dard of living contemplated in the decree; (2) 
Husband's ability to pay the full alimony 
amount; and (3) Wife's needs. English, 565 
P.2d at 411-12. 
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Here, the court permitted Wife's attor-
ney to proffer testimony regarding the 
amount and reasonableness of attorney 
fees. Husband's attorney did not object. 
The court then found that Wife incurred 
legal fees amounting to approximately 
$15,000. It ordered Husband to pay only 
$3,000 of those fees, offering no explana-
tion for the reduction. 
Other than its previous finding relating 
to an increase in Wife's income, the court 
failed to find whether Wife needed finan-
cial assistance. In addition, while the court 
made general findings regarding Hus-
band's income, it made no findings regard-
ing Husband's ability to pay Wife's attor-
ney fees. Moreover, despite evidence prof-
fered by Wife's attorney, the court failed 
to make findings regarding the reasonable-
ness of the fees. 
Because the proffered evidence of Wife's 
attorney fees was adequate and entirely 
undisputed, the court abused its discretion 
in reducing the requested amount from a 
sum of more than $15,000 to $3,000 without 
a finding that the reduction was warranted 
by one of the established factors. 
In addition, our remand of the alimony 
issue may have an effect on the award of 
attorney fees. See, e.g., Rudman v. Rud-
man, 812 P.2d 73, 77 (Utah App.1991). 
We therefore remand the issue of attor-
ney fees for the court to make specific 
findings regarding Wife's financial need 
and Husband's ability to pay. In the event 
the court finds both need and ability to pay, 
it must then make independent findings 
regarding the reasonableness of all fees 
and costs of all the attorneys Wife has 
employed to defend the petition to reduce 
and eliminate alimony, including fees in-
curred on appeal. 
CONCLUSION 
We remand the issue of alimony for the 
court to make specific findings, supported 
by sufficient evidence, regarding whether 
the material circumstances of these parties 
have or have not substantially changed in 
ways not contemplated by the original de-
cree such that modification of the decree 
may be warranted. We also remand the 
issue of attorney fees for the court to make 
specific findings regarding Wife's financial 
need, Husband's ability to pay, and regard-
ing the reasonableness of the fees request-
ed, both for the modification hearing and 
this appeal. 
JACKSON and RUSSON, JJ., concur. 
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Anna Lee ANDERSON, Plaintiff 
and Appellant, 
v, 
DEAN JITTER REYNOLDS, INC., 
Ralph Pahnke, and John Does 1 
Through 25, Defendants and Appellees. 
No. 920228-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
Nov. 13, 1992. 
Beneficiary of express trust sued 
stockbroker and brokerage firm alleging 
improper distribution of trust assets. The 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, J. 
Dennis Frederick, J., dismissed complaint 
on ground that beneficiary did not have 
standing to sue. Beneficiary appealed. 
The Court of Appeals, Jackson, J., held that 
beneficiary could prove facts showing she 
had standing to bring suit for the improper 
distribution of the stock sufficient to with-
stand motion to dismiss for failure to state 
a claim. 
Reversed and remanded. 
1. Appeal and Error <3=>863, 919 
When reviewing motion to dismiss 
based on failure to state a claim, appellate 
court must accept material allegations that 
the complaint is true, and the trial court's,, 
ruling should be affirmed only if it clearly 
appears the complainant can prove no set 
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59(a) (1987) (applicable to criminal proceed-
ings by virtue of Rule 81(e)). Thus, if 
jurors were to agree that a verdict would 
be based on a "divine sign," a Ouija board 
answer, or some fortuitous event, such a 
verdict, in my judgment, would constitute a 
denial of due process and the right to trial 
by jury. 
The trial judge ruled that Rule 606(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence (1987) prohibit-
ed him from considering the allegations in 
the affidavit submitted by defendant1 
Rule 606(b) governs the admissibility of 
juror testimony and affidavits for purposes 
of impeaching a jury verdict The majority 
sustains that ruling, holding that "prayer 
and supposed responses to prayer are not 
included within the meaning of the words 
'outside influence'" as used in Rule 606(b). 
I believe the majority fails to draw a 
critical distinction between the legitimacy 
of jurors' seeking divine assistance in accu-
rately and dispassionately weighing the evi-
dence and the illegitimacy of jurors' abdi-
cating their sworn duty to decide the case 
on the evidence and instead relying on 
some supposedly divine sign. Although 
"[a] juror is fit to serve if he or she can 
impartially weigh the evidence and apply 
the law to the facts as he or she finds 
them," as the majority observes, the fact 
appears to be that the juror in question did 
not impartially weigh the evidence and ap-
ply the law to the facts, but disregarded 
the evidence and the law and ruled on the 
basis of an "outside influence." Accord-
ingly, the trial court could have relied on 
the affidavit under Rule 606(b) for the pur-
pose of deciding that a hearing on the 
allegations should have been held. It is of 
particular significance that the juror in 
question is alleged to have been "one of the 
leaders" during the jury deliberations. 
1. Rule 606(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence 
(1987) states: 
(b) Inquiry into validity of verdict or indict-
ment. Upon an inquiry into the validity of a 
verdict or indictment, a juror may not testify 
as to any matter or statement occurring dur-
ing the course of the jury's deliberations or to 
the effect of anything upon his or any other 
juror's mind or emotions as influencing him 
to assent to or dissent from the verdict or 
indictment or concerning his mental pro-
In my view, a verdict based on chance, 
like a verdict based on a supposed divine 
sign, falls within the meaning of the terms 
"extraneous prejudicial information" and 
"outside influence," as those terms are 
used in Rule 606(b) of the Rules of Evi-
dence. If, therefore, the allegations of the 
affidavit are true, defendant would be enti-
tled to a new trial under Rule 24 of the 
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
I would remand the case to the trial 
court for an evidentiary hearing to deter-
mine whether the jurors decided the case 
on the evidence or whether there was re-
liance on factors outside the record. 
Verlora CARLTON, Plaintiff 
and Respondent, 
v, 
Frank Hayden CARLTON, Defendant 
and Appellant 
No. 860247-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 3, 1988. 
Husband appealed from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Jay 
E. Banks, J., distributing property in di-
vorce proceeding. The Court of Appeals, 
Greenwood, J., held that trial court's fail-
ure to make finding as to value of parties1 
assets in making distribution constituted 
cesses in connection therewith, except that a 
juror may testify on the question whether ex-
traneous prejudicial information was improp-
erly brought to the jury's attention or whether 
any outside influence was improperly brought 
to bear upon any juror. Nor may his affidavit 
or evidence of any statement by him concern-
ing a matter about which he would be pre-
cluded from testifying be received for these 
purposes. 
(Emphasis added.) 
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reversible error requiring remand for entry 
of additional findings. 
Vacated and remanded. 
Jackson, J., dissented and filed an opin-
ion. 
Divorce «=>253(4), 286(9), 287 
In divorce proceeding, trial court's fail-
ure to make findings as to value of parties' 
assets in making equitable distribution of 
property constituted reversible error re-
quiring remand for entry of additional find-
ings; trial court on remand was required to 
make findings as to value of parties1 vari-
ous assets, if trial court were to award 
wife any of husband's premarital property, 
trial court would be required to enter find-
ings explaining circumstances justifying 
such an award, and trial court was required 
to indicate whether it was valuing parties' 
assets as of time of divorce or as of time of 
separation. 
B.L. Dart (argued), John D. Parken, Salt 
Lake City, for defendant and appellant. 
Paul H. Liapis, John C. Green (argued), 
Gustin, Adams, Kasting & Liapis, Salt 
Lake City, for plaintiff and respondent. 
Before DAVIDSON, JACKSON and 
GREENWOOD, JJ. 
OPINION 
GREENWOOD, Judge: 
Defendant, Frank Hayden Carlton, ap-
peals the trial court's property distribution 
in a divorce proceeding, claiming that the 
trial court did not enter sufficient findings 
of fact and inequitably awarded property. 
We vacate the property award and remand. 
Plaintiff, Verlora Carlton, and defendant 
were married on June 18, 1979, separated 
in December 1984 and divorced in August 
1986. At the time of trial, plaintiff was 
forty-nine and defendant was sixty-four. 
Throughout the marriage, defendant 
worked as a certified public accountant and 
earned over $100,000 gross annual income 
during most of the marriage. Plaintiff did 
not work during the marriage, but before 
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the marriage she had operated a cosmetolo-
gy shop and earned approximately $1,100 
gross income per month. At the time of 
trial, plaintiffs gross income was $800 per 
month. 
Defendant testified at trial that his pre-
marital assets totalled $761,925 while plain-
tiff testified that she had $24,935 in assets 
at the time of the marriage. Both parties 
presented exhibits regarding the values of 
their assets. Defendant claimed to have 
gained only about $75,000 in additional as-
sets during the course of the marriage. 
However, plaintiff claimed that she was 
entitled to assets totaling $201,591.85 in 
value as her share of the parties' marital 
estate. Without placing a value on the 
items constituting the parties' assets, the 
court found that "the marital appreciation 
in the assets which the parties acquired 
during the marriage and/or maintained 
during the marriage, totals $255,827.00." 
The court then subtracted plaintiffs pre-
marital assets of $27,228 from that amount 
and awarded plaintiff one-half of the ad-
justed marital estate of $228,099 plus the 
value of h6r premarital assets, for a total 
of $144,277. 
On appeal, defendant claims the trial 
court erred in failing to make sufficient 
findings of fact as to the value of the 
parties' assets and that the property distri-
bution is inequitable because it distributes 
a substantial portion of defendant's pre-
marital assets t6 plaintiff. 
In divorce proceedings, the trial court is 
given considerable discretion in fashioning 
an equitable property distribution, Jones v. 
Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 1985); 
Sampinos v. Sampinos, 750 P.2d 615, 618 
(Utah Ct.App.1988), and its findings will 
not be disturbed absent an abuse of discre-
tion. Boyle v. Boyle, 735 P.2d 669, 670 
(Utah CtApp.1987). The trial court must 
make findings on all material issues, and 
its failure to do so constitutes reversible 
error "unless the facts in the record are 
'clear, uncontroverted, and capable of sup-
porting only a finding in favor of the judg-
ment' " Acton t>. JB. Deliran, 737 P.2d 
996, 999 (Utah 1987) (quoting Kinkella v. 
BaugK 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)). In 
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addition, the findings must be sufficiently 
detailed and consist of enough subsidiary 
facts to reveal the steps the court took to 
reach its conclusion on each factual issue 
presented. Acton, 737 P.2d at 999; Lee v. 
Lee, 744 P.2d 1378, 1380 (Utah CtApp. 
1987). Finally, the trial court's failure to 
include property valuations in divorce ac-
tions may constitute an abuse of discretion 
sufficient to require remand for determina-
tion. Jones, 700 P.2d at 1074; Boyle, 735 
P.2d at 671. 
This divorce proceeding involved numer-
ous different assets including at least thir-
ty different stocks and bonds, six savings 
accounts, four checking accounts, several 
bronze statutes, the parties' residence, 
IRAs and a Keogh plan. Defendant's ex-
hibits valued the assets at the time of the 
marriage and at the time of the separation, 
which was a year and a half before the 
divorce decree was entered. Defendant's 
exhibits also separately itemized the securi-
ties acquired during the marriage. Plain-
tiffs proposed property distribution listed 
only a portion of the parties' assets appar-
ently valued as of the trial in December 
1985. 
The testimony at trial and the exhibits 
clearly indicate that the parties hotly con-
tested the values of many of the assets. 
For example, the parties' exhibits differ on 
the value of the E.F. Hutton Investment 
account. Plaintiffs exhibit values the E.F. 
Hutton Investment account at $113,000, 
while defendant's exhibit indicates that the 
account decreased $62,400 in value during 
the parties' marriage and was worth only 
$29,217 at the time of the separation. De-
fendant conceded, however, that the E.F. 
Hutton Investment account increased in 
value from $29,217 at the time of the sepa-
ration to $113,000 at the time of the trial 
but testified that he believed the estate 
should be valued as of the date the parties 
separated. The trial court found that the 
parties acquired "stocks and bonds in an 
investment account with E.F. Hutton In-
vestment Company" during the marriage 
but did not place a value on the account 
In addition, the findings do not state 
whether the court valued the E.F. Hutton 
Investment account as of the time of the 
separation or as of the time of the divorce. 
The values of many other assets were also 
controverted. 
Based on the trial court's findings, we 
cannot determine how the court arrived at 
its conclusion that the marital assets had 
appreciated by $255,327 during the mar-
riage. The trial court did not clearly state 
which assets were marital or premarital 
nor did it value all of the individual assets. 
The general rule is that 
Premarital property . . . may be viewed 
as separate property, and in appropriate 
circumstances, equity will require that 
each party retain the separate property 
brought to the marriage. However, the 
rule is not invariable. In fashioning an 
equitable property division, trial courts 
need consider all of the pertinent circum-
stances. 
Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133, 135 (Utah 
1987). 
Because we cannot determine how the 
court arrived at the amount of appreciation 
of the marital estate during the parties' 
seven year marriage, we are also unable to 
determine whether the court allowed each 
party to retain all or some portion of his or 
her separate property. Although the find-
ings indicate that the parties were d 
most of what was claimed as pre. ital 
property, the findings do not specify 
whether some of the assets, such as the 
savings and checking accounts, were pre-
marital property. For example, the court 
found that the parties had acquired "nu-
merous bank accounts" during the mar-
riage, but did not specify if all of the bank 
accounts distributed in the divorce were 
acquired during the marriage. In the 
event the court awarded plaintiff some of 
defendant's premarital property, the court 
must follow Burke and make findings 
which explain the circumstances warranto 
ing an award of defendant's premarital 
property to plaintiff. 
In addition, we cannot determine from 
the court's findings if the parties' assets 
were valued at the time of the divorce 
decree or at the time of the separation. 
Generally, assets are valued at the time of 
CARLTON 
Cite a» 756 P.2d I 
the divorce decree. Berger v. Berger, 713 
P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985); Peck v. Peck, 
738 P.2d 1050, 1052 (Utah Ct.App.1987). 
"However, where one party has dissipated 
an asset, hidden its value, or otherwise 
acted obstructively, the trial court may, 
under its broad discretion, value the prop-
erty at an earlier date, i.e., separation." 
Id. The findings in this case do not indi-
cate whether the court valued the assets at 
the time of the divorce or the time of the 
separation. However, it appears from the 
evidence received by the court that some of 
the assets were only valued as of the time 
of the parties' separation. 
Further, the facts in the record are not 
"clear, uncontroverted, and capable of sup-
porting only a finding in favor of the judg-
ment" Acton, 737 P.2d at 999. The dis-
sent urges application of the methodology 
utilized in Olson v. Olson, 704 P.2d 564 
(Utah 1985). In Olson, the court failed to 
make a finding of the wife's financial needs 
in determining an alimony award. The 
Utah Supreme Court, nevertheless, af-
firmed the alimony award, finding it was 
appropriate if the court assumed the wife's 
claimed financial need, which the husband 
disputed, was true. 
The Olson approach is not applicable in 
this case where the parties disputed many 
values, and we would have to speculate on 
the trial court's view as to the value of 
each asset Unlike Olson, we cannot sim-
ply assume as true one disputed value. 
Instead, we must speculate on numerous 
disputed facts. In addition, the Olson 
Court found that if it added a finding of 
financial need in the amount claimed by the 
wife, the Court would not disturb the ali-
mony award. This case differs because we 
cannot determine if the property distribu-
tion was fair and equitable without a valua-
tion of each asset and a designation as to 
which property was premarital and marital. 
Furthermore, the difficulty in applying Ol-
son is compounded by the court's failure to 
distinguish between separation and time of 
trial valuations. 
Therefore, we hold that the trial court's 
failure to make findings as to the value of 
the parties' assets constitutes reversible er-
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ror requiring this Court to remand for en-
try of additional findings. On remand, the 
court must make findings as to the value of 
the parties' various assets, and, if the court 
awards plaintiff any of defendant's premar-
ital property, the court must enter findings 
which explain the circumstances justifying 
such award. See Burke, 733 P.2d at 135. 
In addition, the court's findings must indi-
cate whether the court is valuing the par-
ties' assets as of the time of the divorce or 
as of the time of the separation. 
Judgment vacated as to the property 
award and remanded for further proceed-
ings consistent with this opinion. 
DAVIDSON, J., concurs. 
JACKSON, Judge (dissenting): 
I depart from the majority at two points. 
First, I am concerned that remand of this 
case will impose an unnecessary burden on 
the judicial system and the parties. The 
remand will require a new trial unless the 
judge who originally heard this matter, for-
mer District Court Judge Jay E. Banks, can 
be recalled from the ranks of the retired. 
Another trial judge will find it impossible 
to dredge from the depths of the record all 
the specific findings ordered by the majori-
ty. 
Secondly, we need not impose any bur-
den upon Judge Banks or one of his col-
leagues in this case. The law is clear in 
Utah that, in order to permit appellate re-
view, a trial court's distribution of marital 
assets whose values are contested by the 
parties should be based upon specific writ-
ten findings as to what those values are. 
Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1074 (Utah 
1985). In Jones, the Court concluded that 
the remedy o( remand was appropriate be-
cause "[i]f the trial court accepted one set 
of values, the [appellant] wife was clearly 
awarded too little; if another set was 
adopted, it is possible that the trial court 
did not abuse its discretion." Id 
Four months after Jones, the Utah Su-
preme Court decided Olson v. Olson, 704 
P.2d 564 (Utah 1985), in which the appel-
lant ex-wife challenged the amount of ali-
mony awarded her. She claimed that the 
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trial court had failed to consider her finan-
cial condition 'and needs, one of three 
factors that must be considered by the trial 
court in fixing the amount of alimony. Id. 
at 566. The unanimous Court agreed that 
the trial court's findings on this factor 
were inadequate, but it did not end its 
analysis there and remand to the district 
court Instead, it accepted her evidence on 
these issues as true and reached her sub-
stantive claim, ultimately affirming the 
amount of the trial court alimony award: 
Turning to the record in the absence of 
sufficient findings, we find conflicting 
evidence on some factual issues material 
to a determination of the wife's financial 
condition and needs. Nevertheless, even 
accepting as true, for purposes of re-
view, the [appellant] wife's evidence on 
these issues, we find no abuse of discre-
tion in the amount of alimony awarded. 
Id. at 567. This approach to the disposition 
of the appeal makes sense. The trial 
court's findings must be supported by the 
evidence. Accordingly, the best an appel-
lant could do—if adequate findings were 
made at trial or on remand—is to have the 
court accept his or her evidence on the 
disputed point If even that version of the 
facts does not justify disturbing the trial 
court's judgment, then there is no reason 
for the appellate court to send the case 
back for more specific findings that will 
not ultimately change the outcome of the 
case. 
The Utah Supreme Court applied this 
commonsense approach again in Claus v. 
Claus, 727 P.2d 184 (Utah 1986). As in the 
case before us, the appellant husband in 
Clans challenged the trial court's distribu-
tion of marital property. He complained 
that the trial court had failed to make 
findings as to the values of each party's 
premarital assets and the increase of those 
values during the marriage. The trial 
court had totalled the equities of all the 
parties' properties and then awarded nearly 
half of the total to each. Id. at 185. In its 
per curiam opinion, the Utah Supreme 
Court did not automatically remand for 
specific findings on the disputed values of 
individual assets. It looked to the entire 
record and affirmed the trial court's prop-
erty distribution, concluding that it was 
"eminently fair" to the appellant Id. 
Subsequent to Olson and Claus, the 
Utah Supreme Court explicitly held that 
the failure to make findings on all material 
issues is reversible error unless the facts in 
the record are clear, uncontroverted, and 
capable of supporting only a finding in 
favor of the judgment Acton v. Deliran, 
737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987). In applying 
the Acton standard in appeals challenging 
the property distribution in a divorce de-
cree, the Court has not indicated that the 
sensible appellate practice used in Olson is 
to be thrown out the window, resulting in 
meaningless and burdensome remands to 
the district courts. 
In Gardner v. Gardner, 748 P.2d 1076 
(Utah 1988), for example, the appellant 
wife challenged the trial court's complete 
failure to assign values to, and to distrib-
ute as marital property, the husband's re-
tirement account and medical assets where 
the parties' figures varied considerably. 
The Court remanded Gardner for the entry 
of specific findings, concluding that it could 
not perform its reviewing function and de-
termine whether the parties' property was 
equitably distributed without more detailed 
findings regarding the valuation of assets. 
Id at 1080. Just as it had in Jones, the 
Court pointed out that the award to respon-
dent Mr. Gardner of all his retirement 
funds and medical assets might ultimately 
turn out to be proper and equitable if the 
trial court adopted his evidence as to their 
value. Id But the appellate court might, 
presumably, agree with appellant Mrs. 
Gardner that the trial court's property 
award was inequitable if the trial court 
findings adopted her evidence of their val-
ues. 
No such problem is presented by this 
case. Even if we accept appellant's version 
of what the value of the marital estate and 
the individual asset valuations should have 
been, the overall marital property distribu-
tion is eminently equitable to him. There-
fore, additional findings are not needed to 
support affirmance of the trial court's 
award. 
CARLTON 
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The majority unfortunately elevates 
form over substance by slavishly and, I 
believe, misguidedly applying Acton, with-
out regard for appellant's only substantive 
issue on appeal, namely, whether the trial 
court's apportionment of the marital prop-
erty "was clearly unjust or a clear abuse of 
discretion." Gardner, 748 P.2d at 1078. 
The majority insists on having additional 
and more specific findings in order to un-
derstand the trial court's ultimate total of 
$228,099 in marital property, one-half of 
which was awarded to each party. All they 
really want are some intermediate mathe-
matical calculations.1 To justify their re-
mand, my colleagues have clothed this case 
in the raiment of complexity. "[E]ven Sol-
omon in all his glory was not arrayed like 
one of these." Matthew 6:29. But we 
need not undress the entire record to ex-
pose the equity of the trial court's ultimate 
marital property finding. 
Judge Banks's findings contain an order-
ly, step-by-step route of factual conclusions 
that leads to the ultimate disposition with-
out detour. Finding 6 identifies Mrs. Carl-
ton's premarital property, which the court 
awarded to her. Finding 13 valued her 
property at $27,228. Finding 7 identifies 
Mr. Carlton's premarital property, which 
the court awarded to him; no value was 
fixed. Findings 8 through 12 identify the 
properties which the parties acquired dur-
ing the course of their marriage and make 
some specific offsetting awards, leaving an 
adjusted marital estate of $228,099.2 A 
1. The majority states, "we cannot determine 
how the court arrived at its conclusion that the 
marital assets had appreciated by $255,327 dur-
ing the marriage." The trial court valued Mrs. 
Carlton's premarital property at $27,228 and 
awarded it to her. The majority has included 
her premarital property in the "appreciation." 
The trial court, in finding 13, found a marital 
estate of $228,099 and awarded Mrs. Carlton 
one-half, i.e., $114,048. 
2. The values used by Judge Banks in reaching 
this total are contained in Mrs. Carlton's Exhibit 
14P, her itemization of the "assets of parties" 
and her asserted values for each asset, totalling 
$403,000. She excluded her premarital proper-
ty and his premarital Bear Lake home. Judge 
Banks subtracted $175,000 from her total, com-
prised of the following items: $38,000 (for the K 
Street home awarded to him as premarital prop-
erty); $10,000 (for the Saratoga, Wyoming lot 
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total of $144,277 was awarded to Mrs. Carl-
ton, i.e., $114,049 (one-half the adjusted 
marital estate) plus her premarital property 
of $27,228. In Finding 14, the court sub-
tracted from this figure $12,041 in assets 
she took at the time of separation, leaving 
her a balance of $129,236. The remaining 
marital assets are identified as specific 
bank and investment accounts with fixed 
values from which Mrs. Carlton received 
the balance of her marital property award, 
including $99,124.29 from their E.F. Hutton 
account.3 
Viewed in light of the values assigned by 
Mr. Carlton, the trial court's property dis-
tribution is patently equitable. Appellant 
elected to use values calculated as of-the 
date of the parties' separation, although 
assets are generally valued as of the time 
of the divorce decree. See Berger v. Ber-
gert 713 P.2d 695, 697 (Utah 1985). Mr. 
Carlton's values were submitted via Exhib-
it 35D, consisting of underlying itemized 
schedules summarized onto a front sheet. 
His summary valued his premarital proper-
ty at $761,925 at the time of marriage, 
increasing to $837,732 at separation, for a 
total $75,807 increase during the marriage. 
But, assigning his specified values to the 
assets the court awarded him yields a total 
value of $889,000.4 Thus computed, he re-
ceived $127,000 more than his premarital 
value. This compares favorably with the 
court's award to him of $114,049, one-half 
of the adjusted marital estate. 
awarded to her); $14,000 (for the 1985 Lincoln 
awarded to him); and $113,000 (for the value at 
trial of the E.F. Hutton account created from 
his premarital savings). The $228,000 balance 
($403,000 minus $175,000) divided equally be-
tween the parties represents the value of all the 
remaining marital assets, including a one-half 
interest in land in Carbon County, numerous 
liquid asset accounts, and several bronzes and 
sculptures. 
3. As acknowledged by the majority, Mr. Carlton 
testified that the E.F. Hutton account balance 
was $113,000 at time at trial. Mrs. Carlton's 
evidence fixed the same value. 
4. This figure gave Mr. Carlton the benefit of a 
claimed $100,000 loss of value on his Bear Lake 
home, i.e., from $300,000 to $200,000 during the 
marriage. 
A~iq 
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Acceptance of Mr. Carlton's own values 
reveals no serious inequity or abuse of 
discretion in the property distribution as 
far as he is concerned. Although Mrs. 
Carlton might have some reason to com-
plain, she has not cross-appealed to chal-
lenge the trial court's award.8 The find-
ings show that the trial court considered 
each item of property. The premarital 
property was delineated and awarded re-
spectively to each party. Hers was as-
signed a total value; his was not Individ-
ual valuations of their premarital assets 
were not material since the ultimate issue 
was the equitable division of marital prop-
erty, not premarital property. 
Where the asset values claimed by appel-
lant at trial show he received an equitable 
share of the marital property and no clear 
abuse of discretion is otherwise proven, we 
ought to defer to the trial court's property 
distribution. The judgment of the trial 
court should be affirmed. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
v. 
Jon C. VASILACOPULOS, Defendant 
and Appellant 
Nos. 870291-CA; 870507-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
June 3, 1988. 
Rehearing Denied July 19, 1988. 
Defendant appealed from order of the 
Third District Court, Salt Lake County, Ho-
5. The property distribution is also eminently 
fair when reviewed on the basis of marital in-
come. The majority identifies a seven-year 
marriage and acknowledges that Mr. Carlton 
"earned over $100,000.00 gross annual income 
during most of the marriage." Their tax returns 
show that his adjusted gross income ranged 
from a high of $117,000 to a low of $88,000. 
The parties maintained a frugal lifestyle, except 
for regular business trips that were expensed 
through his CPA business. Most of the approxi-
mer F. Wilkinson, J., denying his motion to 
withdraw guilty plea. The Court of Ap-
peals, Bench, J., held that record did not 
establish that defendant understood possi-
bility of consecutive sentences when he en-
tered plea of guilty. 
Reversed, convictions vacated, and 
matter remanded. 
1. Criminal Law e»1149 
Denial of motion to withdraw guilty 
plea will be reversed only when it clearly 
appears that the trial court has abused its 
discretion. U.C.A.1953, 77-13-6. 
2. Criminal Law ^273.1(4) 
Trial court may not rely on defense 
counsel or executed affidavits to satisfy 
specific requirements of admonishing de-
fendant before accepting plea of guilty. 
U.C.A.1953, 77-35-ll(e). 
3. Courts <&=>100(1) 
Where defendant entered his guilty 
plea prior to date of Supreme Court deci-
sion requiring strict compliance with admo-
nition requirements, the strict compliance 
standard did not apply and test for review-
ing efficacy of plea hearing was whether 
the record as a whole affirmatively estab-
lished that defendant entered his plea with 
knowledge and understanding of its conse-
quences. U.C.A.1953, 77-35-ll(e). 
4. Criminal Law <s=*273.1(4) 
Defendant's statement that he had 
gone over affidavit with his attorney and 
understood the contents of that guilty plea 
affidavit and that he understood that he 
was waiving his right to trial, to confront 
witnesses, and to appeal to a higher court 
did not establish that defendant understood 
mately $700,000 of income earned during the 
marriage was invested in liquid assets. The 
court found an accumulation of only $228,000. 
I find it inconceivable that the remaining $472,-
000 of income was spent by these two people for 
consumables during their short marriage. Mrs. 
Carlton was awarded no alimony. Her $114,-
000 property award, about which she has not 
complained, appears fair, equitable and even 
generous to Mr. Carlton's side of the ledger. 
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The Board denied appellant parole and set 
the next parole hearing date for August 
1992. 
On October 16, 1991, appellant filed a 
Complaint for Extraordinary Writ seeking 
habeas corpus relief. The district court 
granted the State's motion to dismiss the 
complaint 
ISSUE 
Did the Board of Pardons' procedures 
and regulations deny appellant's right to 
state and federal due process at the July 
1991 parole hearing? 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing an appeal from a dis-
missal of a habeas corpus petition, "we 
survey the record in the light most favor-
able to the findings and judgment; and 
we will not reverse if there is a reasonable 
basis therein to support the trial court's 
refusal to be convinced that the writ should 
be granted." Medina v. Cook, 779 P.2d 
658, 658 (Utah 1989) (emphasis added). 
ANALYSIS 
[1,2] For appellant to succeed on his 
due process claim under the United States 
Constitution, he must first show he was 
denied a constitutionally protected liberty 
interest. See Gray v. Department of 
Emp. Sec., 681 P.2d 807, 816 (Utah 1984). 
The presence of a parole system does not, 
by itself, "give rise to a constitutionally 
protected liberty interest in parole release." 
Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 
373, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2418, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 
(1987). For a liberty interest to arise, there 
must first be statutory language limiting 
the parole board's discretion. Hatch v. De-
land, 790 P.2d 49, 50-51 (Utah App.1990). 
Utah's parole statute contains no such limi-
tations. Id. at 51; Utah Code Ann. § 77-
27-9(1) (Supp.1992). 
[3] Under the Utah Constitution, the 
due process clause of article I, section 7 is 
"comprehensive in its application to all ac-
tivities of state government." Foote v. 
Utah Bd. of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 
(Utah 1991). What process is due in any 
given circumstance may vary, "but as-
suredly, the parole board is not outside the 
constitutional mandate that the actions of 
government must afford due process of 
law." Id. (footnote omitted). The process 
due at a board of pardons hearing can only 
be determined "after the facts concerning 
the procedures followed by the board are 
flushed [sic] out." Foote, 808 P.2d at 735. 
[4] The record consists only of a com-
plaint for habeas corpus relief and memo-
randa in support of and in opposition to a 
motion to dismiss. There is nothing in the 
record showing what transpired at appel-
lant's hearings before the parole board or 
the trial court. Moreover, the trial court 
summarily dismissed his petition without 
entering any findings or stating the legal 
basis for its judgement. The record does 
not reveal any basis for a habeas corpus 
determination. "[I]n the absence of an ad-
equate record, this court is unable to con-
duct a meaningful review of the board's 
actions or of [appellant's] due process 
claims." Id. 
Accordingly, we remand to the district 
court for a hearing to develop the record 
and for entry of findings in support of its 
determination. 
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ., 
concur. 
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OHLINE CORPORATION, a California 
Corporation, Plaintiff and 
Appellant, 
v. 
GRANITE MILL, a Utah Corporation, 
Defendant and Appellee. 
No. 920215-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 9, 1993. 
Seller brought action against buyer, 
seeking to recover unpaid amount under 
A-21 
OHLINE CORP. v. 
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sales contract The District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Timothy R. Hanson, J., en-
tered judgment in favor of buyer, and sell-
er appealed. The Court of Appeals, Bill-
ings, P.J., held that even if overtime 
charges incurred by buyer as result of sell-
er's late delivery of shutters were conse-
quential, rather than incidental damages, 
buyer was entitled to recover offset for 
those charges. 
Affirmed. 
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late. The trial court, after a trial on the 
merits, awarded Granite Mill the offset. 
We affirm. 
1. Appeal and Error <s=>757(3) 
On appeal from judgment entered in 
action for breach of sales contract, seller 
failed to marshal the evidence, as required 
to challenge trial court's findings of fact on 
appeal, where seller merely selected facts 
from trial that were most favorable to its 
position, then reargued those facts on ap-
peal. 
2. Sales <^418(16.1) 
Even if overtime charges incurred by 
buyer as result of seller's late delivery of 
shutters were consequential, rather than 
incidental damages, buyer was entitled to 
recover offset for those charges, where 
seller was aware that buyer was working 
under deadline at time it entered into con-
tract. U.C.A.1953, 70A-2-715, 70A-2-
715(2), 70A-2-717. 
Gerald M. Conder, Salt Lake City, for 
plaintiff and appellant. 
Bruce T. Jones and Paul M. Simmons, 
Salt Lake City, for defendant and appellee. 
Before BILLINGS, GREENWOOD and 
RUSSON, JJ. 
OPINION 
BILLINGS, Presiding Judge: 
Plaintiff Ohline Corporation filed this ac-
tion to collect the balance of $9405 due for 
window shutters delivered to Granite Mill. 
Granite Mill acknowledged it received the 
shutters but claimed it was entitled to an 
offset equal to the $9405 unpaid purchase 
price because Ohline had breached the par-
ties' contract by delivering the shutters 
FACTS 
We recite the facts in a light most favor-
able to the trial court's findings. State v. 
Moosman, 794 P.2d 474, 476 (Utah 1990). 
In April 1989, Granite Mill entered into a 
contract with the Las Vegas Hilton Corpo-
ration to remodel suites in the Las Vegas 
Hilton Hotel. The contract required the 
work be completed on or before August 4, 
1989. If Granite Mill did not complete 
work by the contract date, Granite Mill was 
required to pay the rental value of the 
suites until they were available. 
Granite Mill contracted with Ohline to 
manufacture window shutters for the re-
modeling project. Granite Mill repeatedly 
communicated to Ohline the strict August 
4, 1989 completion deadline and the parties 
structured the contract accordingly. On 
May 5, 1989, Granite Mill sent Ohline a 
purchase order for 288 shutters. Due to 
disagreement on payment terms, Ohline 
cancelled the May 5th prder five days later. 
After agreeing on credit and payment 
terms, the purchase order was reinstated 
and a sales contract was finalized. The 
final contract specified the shutters would 
be delivered to Granite Mill "by the third 
week in July—Hopefully Mid-Month." 
The trial court interpreted this to mean the 
shutters would be finished and ready for 
shipment to Granite Mill no later than July 
22, 1989, the last day of the* third week of 
July. 
On June 6, 1989, Granite Mill faxed Oh-
line the final shutter measurements, and 
Ohline began work. On Saturday, July 22, 
1989, Ohline delivered eighty-six or eighty-
seven shutters, approximately one-third of 
the order. The balance of the order was 
shipped via commercial carrier in two sepa-
rate shipments. Thirty-three shutter units 
were shipped on July 25, and the balance 
was shipped on July 26. Granite Mill did 
not receive all of the shutters until the 
afternoon of July 28, 1989, six days late. 
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As a result of the late shipments by 
Ohline, Granite Mill was forced to work 435 
hours of overtime so the shutters could be 
installed by the August 4th deadline. The 
435 overtime hours equated to $9405 of pay 
above Granite Mill's regular hourly rates. 
Ohline invoiced Granite Mill $45,328.62 for 
the shutters. Granite Mill timely paid all 
of the invoice minus the $9405 which it 
claimed as an offset for damages caused by 
the late delivery. 
Ohline subsequently filed suit against 
Granite Mill seeking recovery of the $9405. 
The trial court concluded Ohline had 
breached its agreement to deliver the shut-
ters by July 22, 1989 and Ohline's breach 
had damaged Granite Mill in the amount of 
$9405. Thus, the court entered judgment 
in favor of Granite Mill. 
On appeal, Ohline claims the trial court 
erred in allowing Granite Mill to offset the 
$9405 arguing the trial court's findings of 
fact were in error. It further claims Gran-
ite Mill was not entitled to an offset be-
cause the court erred in considering the 
overtime wages as incidental damages un-
der Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715 (1990).1 
I. FAILURE TO MARSHAL EVIDENCE 
[1] As a threshold issue, Ohline chal-
lenges findings of fact made by the trial 
court. Ohline claims the trial court erred 
in finding that: (1) Ohline was aware of 
Granite Mill's August 4, 1989 completion 
deadline at the time they entered the con-
tract; (2) Ohline agreed to have the shut-
ters ready for shipment no later than July 
22, 1989; (3) Ohline failed to have the mate-
rials ready for shipment on or before July 
22, 1989; (4) Granite Mill was injured in the 
amount of the overtime wages by the late 
delivery; and, (5) Granite Mill made reason-
able efforts to mitigate its damages. 
1. Ohline also asserts the late delivery was ex-
cused because Granite Mill contributed to the 
delay. Ohline, however, raises this issue for the 
first time on appeal. 
To preserve a substantive issue for appeal, a 
party must timely bring the issue to the atten-
tion of the trial court, thus providing the 
court an opportunity to rule on the issue's 
merits. "Issues not raised in the trial court in 
Utah's appellate courts have been clear 
on the burden an appellant must meet 
when challenging; a trial court's findings of 
fact. To successfully challenge a trial 
court's findings of fact on appeal, "[a]n 
appellant must marshal the evidence in 
support of the findings and then demon-
strate that despite this evidence, the trial 
court's findings are so lacking in support 
as to be 'against the clear weight of the 
evidence,' thus making them 'clearly erro-
neous.' " In re Estate ofBartell, 776 P.2d 
885, 886 (Utah 1989) (quoting State v. 
Walker, 743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987)). 
"If the appellant fails to marshal the evi-
dence, the appellate court assumes that the 
record supports the findings of the trial 
court and proceeds to a review of the accu-
racy of the lower court's conclusions of law 
and the application of that law in the case." 
Saunders v. Sharp, 806 P.2d 198, 199 
(Utah 1991). 
Ohline has failed to marshal the evi-
dence. Instead, Ohline has merely selected 
facts from trial that are most favorable to 
its position, and then reargued those facts 
to this court on appeal. Such a tactic ig-
nores "the rules designed to give stability 
to jury verdicts." Hodges v. Gibson Prods. 
Co., 811 P.2d 151, 156 (Utah 1991). There-
fore, we accept the following dispositive 
facts: (1) Ohline understood Granite Mill 
had a strict August 4, 1989 deadline; (2) 
both Ohline and Granite Mill understood 
and agreed the shutters Ohline was fur-
nishing were to be finished and ready for 
shipment no later than July 22, 1989; (S) 
Ohline did not have the shutters ready for 
shipment by July 22, 1989; (4) Granite Mill 
was damaged in the amount of $9405 for 
overtime pay to install the late shutters; 
and, (5) Granite Mill was diligent and made 
reasonable efforts to mitigate its damages. 
timely fashion are deemed waived, precluding 
[the appellate court] from considering their 
merits on appeal." 
LeBaron & Assoc., Inc. v. Rebel Enter., 823 P.2d 
479, 482-83 (Utah App.1991) (citations omitted) 
(quoting Salt Lake County v. Carlston, 116 P.2d 
653, 655 (Utah App.1989)). We therefore refuse 
to consider the issue of excused delay for the 
first time on appeal. 
A. 1\ 
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II. OFFSET 
[2] Ohline next argues that even if we 
accept the trial court's factual findings, the 
trial court incorrectly applied Utah Code 
Ann. § 70A-2-717 (1990)2 in concluding 
Granite should receive an offset because of 
Ohline's late delivery. Ohline argues the 
overtime damages are not recoverable as 
either incidental or consequential damages 
as defined in Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715 
(1990). 
This court reviews a trial court's conclu-
sions of law for correction of error. In 
short, "we accord conclusions of law no 
particular deference, but review them for 
correctness." Scharf v. BMG Corp., 700 
P.2d 1068, 1070 (Utah 1985). A trial 
court's interpretation and application of a 
statute, as in the instant case, presents a 
question of law. State ex rel Division of 
Consumer Protection v. Rio Vista Oil, 
Ltd., 786 P.2d 1343, 1347 (Utah 1990); Be-
rube v. Fashion Centre, Ltd., 771 P.2d 
1033, 1038 (Utah 1989). Accordingly, we 
review for correctness the trial court's de-
termination that Granite Mill's overtime 
damages were incidental damages under 
section 70A-2-715, and thus were properly 
offset pursuant to section 70A-2-717. 
Whether Granite Mill's overtime dam-
ages are labeled as incidental or consequen-
tial is not important under the facts of this 
case. Section 70A-2-715 provides: 
(1) Incidental damages resulting from 
the seller's breach include expenses rea-
sonably incurred in inspection, receipt, 
transportation and care and custody of 
goods rightfully rejected, any commer-
cially reasonable charges, expenses or 
commissions in connection with effecting 
cover and any other reasonable expense 
incident to the delay or other breach. 
2. That section provides: 'The buyer on notify-
ing the seller of his intentions to do so may 
deduct all or any part of the damages resulting 
from any breach of the contract from any part 
of the price still due under the same contract." 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-717 (1990). 
Ohline does not challenge the trial court's 
application of section 70A-2-717, but rather 
limits its appeal to whether the damages were 
properly labeled incidental under Utah Code 
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(2) Consequential damages resulting 
from the seller's breach include 
(a) any loss resulting from general 
or particular requirements and needs 
of which the seller at the time of con-
tracting had reason to know and which 
could not reasonably be prevented by 
cover or otherwise; and 
(b) injury to person or property 
proximately resulting from any breach 
of warranty. 
Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715 (1990). Un-
der this statute, to recover incidental dam-
ages, a buyer must show the damages (1) 
were incurred because of the breach, and 
(2) were reasonable. James J. White & 
Robert S. Summers, Uniform Commercial 
Code § 6-5, at 266 (3d ed. 1988) (White & 
Summers). In contrast, to recover conse-
quential damages, the buyer must* estab-
lish: (1) causation, (2) foreseeability', (3) 
reasonable certainty as to amount, and (4) 
the buyer is not barred by mitigation doc-
trines. See Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-
715(2); White & Summers § 6-5, at 266. 
Ohline does not challenge Granite Mill's 
right to an offset if the damages are prop-
erly characterized as incidental. The plain 
language of section 70A-2-715, includes 
overtime wages as "any other reasonable 
expense incident to the delay or other 
breach." Utah Code Ann. § 70A-2-715 
(1990). Furthermore, although the caselaw 
is limited, there is precedent for labeling 
overtime damages as incidental. See Jay 
V. Zimmerman Co. v. General Mills, Inc., 
327 F.Supp. 1198, 1205 (E.D.Mo.1971) (hold-
ing overtime damages incidental under 
U.C.C. § 2-715); Bockman Printing & 
Services v. Baldwin-Gregg, Inc., 213 111. 
App.3d 516, 527, 157 Ill.Dec. 630, 638, 572 
N.E.2d 1094, 1102 (1991) (concluding over-
time damages may be either incidental or 
consequential).3 
Ann. § 70A-2-715 (1990). Accordingly, wheth-
er Granite Mill .properly notified Ohline of its 
intention to deduct damages from the purchase 
price as required by section 70A-2-717 is not at 
issue. 
3. But see Kabco Equip. Specialists v. Budgetel, 2 
Ohio App.3d 58, 440 N.E.2d 611, 614 (1981) 
(finding overtime conceivably recoverable as 
consequential damages); Consolidated Alumi-
num Corp. v. Krieger, 710 S.W.2d 869 (Ky.App. 
A-2H 
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Even if we were to accept Ohline's char-
acterization of the overtime damages as 
consequential, the result is no different. 
Ohline contends the facts do not satisfy the 
statute's foreseeability requirement for 
consequential damages, because Ohline had 
no reason to know of the August 4, 1989 
deadline. This argument fails because the 
trial court found Ohline was fully aware of 
the deadline when they contracted with 
Granite Mill, a finding we uphold. There-
fore, even if Ohline is correct that Granite 
Mill's overtime damages are consequential 
rather than incidental, Granite Mill is still 
entitled to the offset. 
CONCLUSION 
Because Ohline failed to satisfy its bur-
den to marshal the evidence, we accept the 
trial court's findings of fact. Furthermore, 
Granite Mill was entitled to damages, and 
therefore an offset, regardless of whether 
the overtime damages are considered inci-
dental or consequential under section 70A-
2-715. Accordingly, we affirm the judg-
ment. 
GREENWOOD and RUSSON, JJ., 
concur. 
(O | KEY NUMBER SYSTEM > 
J. Lamar RICHARDS, Plaintiff 
and Appellee, 
v. 
SECURITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK;, 
Debra L. Youngman; Deborah Diam-
anti; Ameristar Financial Corporation; 
Associates Financial Services Compa-
ny, Inc.; First Boston Mortgage Securi-
ties Corp., Defendants and Appellants. 
No. 920679-CA. 
Court of Appeals of Utah. 
March 9, 1993. 
After property owner refinanced, hold-
er of mechanics' lien brought suit contend-
1986) (recognizing trial court's award of over-
time wages as consequential damages even 
ing that it had priority over new mortgage 
holder. The Third District Court, Salt 
Lake County, Pat B. Brian, J., found that 
mechanics' lien had priority, and appeal 
was taken. The Court of Appeals, Billings 
P.J., held that under Utah's mechanics' lien 
statutes, subsequent lender had construc-
tive notice of intervening mechanics' liens 
so that subsequent lender was not entitled 
to use doctrine of equitable subrogation to 
defeat mechanics' lien. 
Affirmed and remanded. 
1. Judgment <&=>181(2, 3) 
Summary judgment is appropriate if 
there are no genuine issues of material fact 
and moving party is entitled to judgment as 
matter of law. 
2. Appeal and Error <3=>842(2), 863 
Trial court's grant of summary judg-
ment is reviewed for correctness, according 
no deference to trial court's legal conclu-
sions whether issue presented on summary 
judgment is one of law or equity. 
3. Subrogation <®=>1 
Individual's access to equitable subro-
gation as remedy depends on principles of 
justice, equity, and benevolence to be ap-
plied to facts of particular case. 
4r Subrogation <s=>31(4) 
"Equitable subrogation" allows credi-
tor, who satisfies prior creditor's lien, to 
acquire lien priority of prior creditor under 
particular circumstances, although applica-
tion of doctrine may be defeated by inter-
vening rights which would be prejudiced; 
equitable nature of doctrine prevents artic-
ulation of unwaivering rule that applies in 
all cases. 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Subrogation <s=>31(4) 
For purposes of determining whether 
doctrine of equitable subrogation applies to 
though labeling not challenged on appeal). 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
Suite 722 Boston Building 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION 
FOR ORDER IN RE: 
ENTRY OF SUPPLEMENTAL 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Case No, 844903928 
Appeal No. 900603-CA 
* - • * • ' / 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARITA W. MUIR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. MUIR, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo r 
Defendant, MICHAEL DOUGLAS MUIR, by and through his attorney, 
Helen E. Christian, hereby moves this Court to enter the following 
Findings of Fact to supplement the findings previously entered by 
the Court subsequent to the trial held in this matter on October 
11, 1990. This motion is made pursuant to the direction of the 
Utah Court of Appeals in its remand of the above-captioned matter 
to this Court, as specifically set forth in the case of Muir v. 
Muir, 841 P.2d 736 (Utah App. 1992). 
Defendant submits the following Findings of Fact for the 
Court's consideration and approval: 
A-ifc 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES 
I. Decrease in Defendant's Earnings 
1. Defendant's gross earnings for the twelve-month period 
ending June 30, 1985, were $118,577, and his gross earnings for the 
twelve-month period ending June 30, 1990, were $81,635. This 
decrease is due to several factors related to the operation of 
Defendant's business as more specifically set forth in these 
findings. 
2. Defendant's ownership in the business known as Fairmont 
Bowl was 71% in 1985, at the time of the parties' divorce, and had 
increased to 96% by the time of the trial on Defendant's Petition 
for Modification. 
3. Defendant's increased stock ownership is due to gifts of 
stock received by him from his father, with whom he has operated 
the business for nearly thirty years. 
4. Despite Defendant's increased stock ownership, 
Defendant's earnings from the business have decreased due to the 
following factors: 
(a) Gross receipts from the business have decreased, and 
the net income to the business, before compensation to the 
Defendant, as reflected on Exhibit 3, went from $226,000 in 1985 to 
$115,260 in 1990, a decrease of approximately 51%. 
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(b) Depreciation taken on assets in 1985 was $81,000, 
which decreased to $33,000 in 1990 due to the fact that the assets 
had been depreciated out and no capital purchases had been made for 
the business. 
(c) The bowling industry has been in a slump for the 
last few years, not only in the state of Utah, but nationally, and 
Defendant's ability to maintain the gross receipts of the business 
at approximately the same level since 1985 is primarily due to 
increased prices for his regular customers. 
(d) The gross receipts of Fairmont Bowl decreased by 
$45,000 from 1985 to 1990, and Defendant has had to increase the 
services he provides to maintain his clientele and to justify the 
increased prices he has had to charge. 
5. Defendant sold a home in 1988 and used some of the 
proceeds from that sale to prepay an SBA loan of approximately 
$15,000 owing by the business in order to save the business the ten 
percent (10%) interest charges. 
6. Defendant has taken loans from the business, and has also 
given loans to the business, and these loans were made with the 
intent that they be repaid by the borrower. The amounts owing by 
Defendant to Fairmont Bowl are debts to be repaid, and not part of 
his compensation from the business. 
7. Defendant submitted financial statements to banking 
institutions for the purchase of obtaining credit and represented 
3 
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on those statements that his net worth had increased from a net 
worth of $479,000 in 1986 to $542,000 in 1989, which increase is 
attributable to Defendant's increased ownership in the business. 
8. Defendant receives certain benefits in addition to his 
monetary compensation from the business, including the use and 
operation of a Chevrolet Blazer, a credit card for the purchase of 
gasoline, membership at the Fort Douglas Country Club, and 
automobile and medical insurance coverage. Although Defendant 
received similar benefits from the business at the time of entry of 
the Decree, the value of the benefits he receives have been reduced 
from what they were at the time of the parties' divorce. 
9. Defendant's current wife also works in the business and 
she receives a salary of $600.00 per month, and has occasionally 
earned as much as $1,000 per month. If she were unable to work in 
the business, Defendant would need to hire an employee to assume 
those duties. 
10. These factors are evidence that Defendant's earnings have 
decreased since the Decree of Divorce, and constitute a substantial 
and material change of circumstances sufficient to warrant a 
reduction of his alimony obligation. 
II. Defendant's need to make capital improvements 
to maintain business in present condition 
11. The physical plant of the business was built in 1958. 
12. Defendant has painted the facility, modernized the 
seating and replaced carpets, seating and ball racks, but has not 
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made any substantial replacement of equipment, such as lanes, 
pinsetters, or lighting for several years. 
13. The thirty two (32) lanes at Fairmont Bowl are 
approximately thirty (30) years old, and need to be replaced, and 
the cost of replacement for each lane is $35,000. 
14. Defendant needs to replace the lanes at Fairmont Bowl by 
the summer of 1991 in order to stay in business. 
15. Defendant needs to make other substantial "big money" 
investments into the business in order to remain competitive in the 
bowling industry. 
16. Defendant's anticipated investments in the business are 
neither discretionary nor with the intention of expanding the 
business; rather, these anticipated investments are necessary to 
maintain the present operation of the business and the viability of 
Fairmont Bowl as a bowling center. 
17. These necessary expenditures will reduce the amount of 
income available to the Defendant from the business. 
18. These factors are evidence that Defendant's earnings from 
the business will not increase in the near future to a level that 
he was earning at the time of entry of the Decree of Divorce, and, 
as such, constitute a substantial and material change of 
circumstances sufficient to warrant a modification of Defendant's 
alimony obligation. 
5 
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III. Attorney's Fees 
19. Plaintiff has gross earnings of $17,000 per year from her 
employment, and also earns additional rental income from the home. 
20. Plaintiff has had to retain counsel to defend against 
Defendant's Petition, and incurred attorney's fees in the amount of 
$13,179 while she was represented by Matthew P. McNulty, and an 
additional amount of approximately $2,600 while she was represented 
by her present counsel. 
21. Defendant has incurred attorney's fees of approximately 
$6,000. 
22. The attorney's fees incurred by Plaintiff for 
representation by her present counsel are reasonable, in light of 
her counsel's expertise and experience the field. The court 
makes no finding as to the reasonableness of the fees incurred by 
Plaintiff for representation by her previous counsel. 
23. Defendant has prevailed in part on his Petition and has 
the ability to contribute towards the payment of Plaintiff's fees. 
DATED this 1 4 ^ day of April, 1993. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
6 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand-delivered a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ORDER IN RE: 
ENTRY OF SUPPLEMENTAL FINDINGS OF FACT this IH day of April, 
1993, addressed to: 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
JAMES P. COWLEY 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84144 
muir.fof 
K r i s t i n e Wimmer 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARITA W. MUIR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. MUIRf 
Defendant. 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR ORDER 
IN RE: FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF 
FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER OF MODIFICATION 
ON REMAND 
Case No. 844903928 DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
ooOoo 
The Plaintiff above-named by and through counsel Suzanne 
Marelius hereby moves the above Court to enter the Findings of 
Factf Conclusions of Law and Order on Defendant's Petition for 
Modification on Remand which are supplemental to the original 
Findings and Decree entered by the Court on October 26, 1990. 
Plaintiff has prepared and filed the supplemental Findingsf and 
Order pursuant to the instructions of the Utah Court of Appeals in 
an opinion dated November 12, 1992, and asks that the Court review 
and enter those, forthwith. 
A-33 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays the above-entitled Court to 
review and enter the "Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and 
Order on Defendant's Petition for Modification on Remand" in the 
above-entitled matter. 
DATED this / /* day of May, 1993. 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
SUZANNE MARELIUS 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR 
ORDER IN RE: FOR ENTRY OF FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
AND ORDER OF MODIFICATION ON REMAND, this / /" day of May, 1993, 
to: 
Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
s5\12485.mtn 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARITA W. MUIR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. MUIR, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER 
REMAND 
Case No. 844903928 DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
ooOoo 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12, 
1992 with instructions that the Court make specific findings, 
supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony, 
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees. Having 
reviewed the Court records and transcript herein, the Court issues 
the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on remand to 
supplement the previous Findings entered in this case. The Court 
enters the following Findings of Fact as follows: 
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FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married for more than twenty years 
prior to their divorce on September 16, 1985. The Defendant filed 
a Petition to Modify alimony five years after the divorce on which 
a trial was held October 11, 1990. 
2. The initial divorce was resolved by joint 
stipulation of the parties and each party received an equal 
property distribution which provided in relevant part that the 
husband receive all common stock owned by the parties in the 
business known as Fairmont Bowl and that the wife receive the 
parties' residence. The husband was ordered to assume the 
liability for business loans incurred by Fairmont Bowl and the wife 
was ordered to assume the mortgage debt on the residence. 
3. The Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff 
alimony of $1,500 per month until her remarriage, cohabitation, the 
death of one of the parties, or further order of the Court. 
4. During the majority of the parties' marriage and at 
the time of the divorce, the Defendant derived all of his income 
from his ownership of Fairmont Bowl and at the time of divorce 
owned 78% of the stock in the entity. At the time of the 
modification hearing his stock ownership had increased to 91.3%, 
with the parties' children owned the remainder of the stock. 
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5. In August
 f 1989, five years after the divorce the 
Defendant petitioned for modification of alimony claiming a 
substantial change in material circumstance and he sought a 
reduction of alimony for one year, followed by complete 
termination. The Defendant based his petition on a claim that his 
income had decreased and that the Plaintiff's income had increased. 
A. Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding Defendant's 
Earnings. 
6. The Defendant alleged specific changes in 
circumstances in that although his gross revenues from his business 
had remained consistent, that his expenses had increased, 
depreciation had decreased and his business needed capital 
investment. Defendant also alleged that the wife's income had 
substantially increased by her earning $1,400 gross per month as a 
flight attendant in the first nine months of 1990, as opposed to 
$1,000 a month at the time of divorce. 
7. Plaintiff's accountant Mr. Randall Peterson, CPA, 
analyzed seven years of tax returns from 1983 through 1989 filed by 
the Defendant. He testified that the returns showed an average 
"pre-divorce" income of to Defendant $104,678 and an average "post-
divorce" income of $104,188. Accountant Peterson analyzed the 
Defendant's "net spendable income" from 1983 to 1989 showing his 
post-divorce average (excluding alimony payments), to be $69,194 
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which was approximately $5,000 more than his before divorce average 
of $64,819. 
8. The Defendant's accountant Mr. Ed Bates agreed with 
Plaintiff's accountant that the gross revenues of the Fairmont Bowl 
Corporation have been consistent and that it has been operated as 
a Subchapter S Corporation since the parties' divorce. On this 
point, the accountants relied on the 1985 tax return for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1985 showing gross receipts to be $691,529 as 
compared with gross receipts at the end of fiscal year June 30, 
1990 where gross receipts were $645,102. 
9. The Defendant has made regular, annual improvements 
to the Fairmont Bowl facility and had just finished computerizing 
the facility, making it one of the most highly competitive in the 
Salt Lake Market place and had also added new carpeting, new racks, 
new seating and other improvements on a regular basis since the 
divorce. Defendant testified to the need for future improvements 
as well. Such capital improvements are in the discretion of 
Defendant whose personal and business finances are intertwined. 
10. Since the divorce, Defendant has prepared four 
separate financial statements for First Interstate Bank which show 
that his total assets and net worth since entry of the divorce as 
stated by him have increased from at least $715,580 in assets on 
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the statement dated January 3, 1986 to $989,000 in assets on a 
statement dated September 7, 1989. 
11. Both Plaintiff's and Defendant's accountants agreed 
that due to the corporation's Subchapter S status, the Defendant 
had total discretion over the amount he took as compensation each 
year, in setting prices for his product, and in making capital 
expenditures. 
12. The Defendant's business has paid for many personal 
expenses for the Defendant and his family including operating 
expenses and payments for his family car, health insurance, travel, 
auto and life insurance, tax deferred benefits including pension 
contributions, and benefits from his new wife drawing a salary from 
the corporation. The Defendant also receives the benefit of loans 
to shareholders from corporate revenues. 
13. Based on the foregoing evidence, the Court does not 
find that there has been a substantial change in the circumstances 
surrounding Defendant's earnings since the parties divorce. His 
income has been consistent when all personal benefits are 
considered and given the Defendant's discretion over allocating 
income between personal and business uses, it is appropriate to 
include all such personal benefits. 
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B. Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding Plaintiff/s 
Income. 
14. The Plaintiff's lifestyle has substantially 
deteriorated since her marriage to the Defendant which consisted of 
a luxurious lifestyle and no financial worries. During the 
marriage the parties resided in a large home they built themselves 
worth $370,000 at the time of the divorce. The parties owned an 
airplane, a boat and took regular trips abroad to various parts of 
the world. 
15. It was undisputed that the Plaintiff's only work 
during the marriage was at Fairmont Bowl where her wages were 
approximately $lf000 per month. Since the divorce, Plaintiff had 
difficulty obtaining new employment as she did not have current 
marketable skills and no recent work experience outside of the 
family business. At the time of the modification hearing Plaintiff 
was working as a flight attendant for American Airlines earning 
$1,400 gross monthly income. Plaintiff's employment required her 
to locate on the East Coast and at the time of the modification 
hearing, she resided in a basement apartment in her mother's home 
in Connecticut for which she paid rent. 
16. Since the divorce the Plaintiff has attempted to 
sell the marital asset she received in the divorce consisting of 
the parties' marital residence in Salt Lake City valued at $370,000 
6 
at the time of the divorce. The Plaintiff had lowered the sales 
price to $280,000 and had received only one offer of $185,000 which 
she rejected. She has continued to maintain the Salt Lake home as 
a rental property and paying mortgage thereon while she resided on 
the East Coast which resulted in very high housing costs. 
17. Although Plaintiff had rented her Salt Lake home 
since the divorce the income therefrom did not pay for the mortgage 
and taxes and she has had consistent losses as shown on her tax 
returns for the maintenance and rental of that property. At the 
time of trial in October, 1990 her rental income thus far in the 
year had been $4,200 and her mortgage costs had been $5,478 with 
additional estimated taxes of $3,000 which would result in an 
income loss that year. 
18. Plaintiff's monthly living expenses totalled $4,701 
per month which included keeping tow homes and $907 per month on 
installment debt relating to legal fees connected with the original 
divorce and to repay her mother a $4,000 loan. Plaintiff had 
depleted all assets awarded to her property settlement other than 
the real property in Salt Lake City. 
19. Since the divorce Plaintiff has had significant 
periods of unemployment, higher costs of living with the necessity 
of maintaining two homes, and her tax returns show regular losses 
from business and real estate. Plaintiff has been dependent on her 
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alimony of $lf500 per month to meet her basic living expenses which 
do not include any of the luxuries or amenities she enjoyed during 
her marriage to Defendant such as vacations, country club 
memberships, or new vehicles. 
20. A review of Plaintiff's tax return shows that in 
only one year, 1988, did her earned income exceeded her alimony 
income, when she earned $20,609 in wages. However, for the year 
1990 Plaintiff projected total earnings of only $17,000 which is 
less than her alimony. 
21. A comparison of the parties' lifestyles at the time 
of the divorce modification in October, 1990 shows that Plaintiff's 
lifestyle has substantially decreased since the time of her 
marriage and the lifestyle of the Defendant has remained unchanged 
and continues to be a luxurious, very comfortable lifestyle. 
22. The Plaintiff is unable to meet her reasonable 
monthly expenses through earnings alone and requires alimony to 
assist in meeting her needs. Plaintiff's expenses are not lavish 
and are unusually high based on the need to maintain two homes and 
to repay loans she has incurred to meet basic expenses since the 
divorce. Although Plaintiff's income may have increased from 
$1,000 to $1,400 per month it is not sufficiently large of a change 
to support a reduction of alimony in this case considering 
Plaintiff's needs. 
8 
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C. Findings on Attorney/s Fees. 
23. The Plaintiff requested that she be reimbursed her 
attorney's fees in defending the modification petition. At the 
time of the modification hearing, Plaintiff was still paying the 
legal costs of the initial divorce and owed her divorce attorney 
$16f000 which she was paying at $100 a month. 
24. Plaintiff incurred $16,000 in legal fees for 
defending the modification proceeding and Defendant had incurred 
$6,000 in bringing the modification petition. Plaintiff's counsel 
proffered the reasonableness and amount of fees without objection 
by Defendant's counsel. 
25. The Court finds Plaintiff has a need for attorney's 
fees, since her monthly expenses exceed her monthly income and it 
would be a clear hardship for her to pay her fees unassisted. In 
addition Plaintiff is still paying on a significant balance 
remaining from her original divorce. The Plaintiff also had a 
significantly more difficult task to defend against the 
modification brought by Defendant to uncover necessary financial 
information whereas Defendant had that information within his 
control. The Defendant has also paid off significant debts since 
the time of the parties' divorce, has invested in costly real 
estate and is building a home, has many luxuries in his budget and 
thus has the ability to assist Plaintiff in the payment of fees. 
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Defendant should pay the full amount of Plaintiff's attorney's fees 
in the amount of $16,000. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to the 
action and over the subject matter of this action. 
2. The parties are entitled to an order on Defendant's 
Petition for Modification, the same to become final and effective 
upon being signed by the Court which should be in conformance with 
the foregoing Findings of Fact. 
DATED this 2 *~ day of ^ ) ^*1^- 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
^HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
10 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER REMAND, this /*/* day of May, 1993, to: 
Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
s5\12485.fof 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
0 0 O 0 0 — • 
MARITA W. MUIR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. MUIR, 
Defendant. 
ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S PETITION 
FOR MODIFICATION ON REMAND 
>-> -. ^ ' f 6LC^*?LIS 
Case No. 844903928 DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
0 0 O 0 0 — • 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12, 
1992 with instructions that the Court make specific findingsf 
supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony, 
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees. Having 
reviewed the Court record and transcript hereinf and having issued 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on Remand, and good 
cause appearing therefore, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
A-Hfc> 
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1. The Petition for Reduction and Termination of 
Alimony is denied as there are no substantial, material changes in 
circumstances of the parties since the divorce to warrant 
modification. 
2. The Defendant is ordered to pay all of Plaintiff's 
costs and attorney's fees incurred in defending the Petition for 
Modification in the amount of $16,000. 
DATED this 2- ^  day of ^ \ ^~\^— 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
ONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
A-m 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing/ ORDER OF MODIFICATION ON 
REMAND, this /~7 day of May, 1993, to: 
Ms, Helen E. Christian/ Esq. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722/ Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
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HELEN E. CHRISTIAN (2247) 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN , . :?T 
Attorney for Defendant '"/- i"' 
Suite 722 Boston Building v-. 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7444 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARITA W. MUIR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. MUIR, 
Defendant. 
ooOoo 
Defendant, MICHAEL MUIR, by and through his counsel of record, 
Helen E. Christian, hereby files these objections to the Findings 
of Fact as proposed by Plaintiff: 
DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS 
TO PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
Case No. 844903928 
Appeal No. 900603-CA 
I. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO 
DEFENDANT'S INCOME 
Plaintiff would have the Court believe that there has been no 
decrease in Defendant's income since entry of the Decree of Divorce 
that would justify a modification of his alimony obligation to the 
Plaintiff. That is simply not the case and is unsupported by the 
evidence presented at trial. 
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 6 claims that Plaintiff's 
income was $1,000 at the time of the divorce, but the evidence at 
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trial established otherwise. Specifically, Plaintiff testified at 
trial that she had "no real income" in 1985 (T.43) when the parties 
were divorced, and that in 1986 she earned between $3,000 and 
$4,000 (T.43). At the time of the trial on Defendant's Petition 
for Modification, Plaintiff was employed as a flight attendant and 
was earning approximately $1,400 per month (T.164). In addition, 
and not included in Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 6 as to her 
income, Plaintiff received the following amounts: 
(a) $100 per month from a family trust (T. 163) 
(b) $220 per month from rental of a barn (T. 164) and 
(c) $1,200 per month from rental of the Salt Lake City 
residence. 
While Plaintiff claimed a loss from her rental of the Salt 
Lake City residence, after payment of property taxes, mortgage 
interest and insurance (Defendant's Exhibit 2), evidence at trial 
established that Plaintiff would still generate income of several 
hundred dollars each month from her rental of the property. 
The bottom line is that Plaintiff's proposed Findings as to 
her earnings are inaccurate and that she should properly claim 
these additional amounts, giving her income of at least $2,000 per 
month. Inasmuch as the alimony awarded at the time of the divorce 
was based on the fact that Plaintiff had no real source of income, 
it was appropriate for the Court to find that her income had 
increased sufficiently and decrease Defendant's alimony obligation. 
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Plaintiff's proposed Findings Nos. 7 and 8 are inaccurate and 
do not reflect the evidence presented at trial. The fact that the 
gross receipts of the business had declined nearly $50,000 
(T.26) fails to address the primary reason that Defendant's 
earnings had decreased, i.e., the substantial increase in the 
expenses of operating Fairmont Bowl. Ed Bates, Defendant's 
accountant, testified at trial that, as Defendant's ownership 
percentage in the business increased, his income actually 
decreased. (T. 24) In fact, Mr. Bates also testified that despite 
the fact that the business had had less depreciation, and the 
actual income of the business should have increased, the income had 
still decreased since the time of the parties' divorce. 
Defendant's Exhibit 3 admitted at trial illustrated that the gross 
receipts for Fairmont Bowl had been decreasing since 1985 (T. 26). 
The evidence at trial established that the net income of the 
corporation for fiscal year ending June 1990, before Defendant's 
compensation and before any depreciation deduction was taken, was 
fifty-one percent (51%) less than it was in 1985. Specifically, 
the net income of the corporation for fiscal year ending June 1985 
was $226,517, compared with $115,000 for fiscal year ending June 
1990. As Defendant testified at trial, these decreases are a 
direct result of the need to increase services to maintain 
clientele to justify the prices charged for the services (T. 64) 
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and the fact that there are fewer participants in the sport. [See 
Defendant's proposed Findings Nos. 4(a), 4(b), 4(c) and 4(d).]| 
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 9 misrepresents the evidence 
presented at trial in the following particulars: Defendant 
testified that the "computerized" facility is actually a series of 
scoring devices that are computerized (T. 75). Defendant also 
testified that he had made other physical improvements, none of 
them "substantial ones," except as to "dollars" (T.75), as follows: 
carpet, new ball racks, new seating, and bowler seating. [See 
Defendant's proposed Finding No. 12.] 
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 9 also mischaracterizes 
Defendant's testimony as to the necessity of future improvements 
that he must make to the physical facility in order to maintain the 
viability of Fairmont Bowl as a bowling center. Specifically, 
Defendant needs to replace the thirty-two lanes, which are 
approximately thirty (30) years old, and the cost to replace each 
lane is $35,000. (T.65). 
Finally, Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 9 mistakenly states 
that the capital improvements that Defendant must make to the 
business are "discretionary," rather than absolutely necessary to 
maintain the present operation of the business. These necessary 
expenditures, Defendant testified, will reduce the cash available 
to him for earnings.( T. 66) [See Defendant's proposed Findings 
Nos. 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.] 
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Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 10 as to financial statements 
prepared by the Defendant for the purpose of obtaining credit 
misrepresents the evidence presented at trial. Defendant testified 
that his net worth, as he made an "educated guess" on the financial 
statements, was $479,000 in 1986 (Exhibit 6) and $542,000 in 1989 
(Exhibit 9), or an increase in net worth of only $62,000. (T. 
112-113) Defendant also testified that the increase in his net 
worth was attributable to his increased stock ownership in Fairmont 
Bowl. (T. 113) 
Plaintifffs proposed Finding No. 11 misstates the evidence 
presented at trial in that it fails to include the primary 
"disadvantage" of a Subchapter "S" corporation, i.e., the fact that 
Defendant must claim any earnings on his personal tax return 
whether he takes the money out of the corporation or leaves it in 
the corporation to pay off loans or use for operating expenses. 
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 12 as to Defendant's personal 
expenses and benefits that are paid from the business is incorrect 
for these reasons: 
(a) Plaintiff testified at trial that she, similarly to 
Defendant's current spouse, worked in the business during the 
marriage, earning approximately $1,000 per month (T.155); 
(b) Defendant testified at trial that his current spouse 
works in the business and her earnings are based on the actual time 
she puts into the business (T.108); 
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(c) Defendant testified at trial that his present lifestyle, 
compared with the lifestyle he and the Plaintiff had enjoyed during 
their marriage, was "substantially" reduced (T. 70), specifically 
testifying that he had sold the boat prior to the parties' divorce 
in 1985 (T. 107), that he had "about $20,000 " in a plane that he 
had purchased shortly after the divorce (.. 106), and that the 
business paid for his health and auto insurance (T. 106). 
Defendant also testified that the business had always paid these 
expenses, despite the fact that the accounting treatment of the 
expenses had been modified. 
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 13 simply ignores the 
testimony at trial and the actual findings of the Court when it 
rendered its decision in this case. Specifically, the Court stated: 
The Court is also persuaded that the 
Defendant in the near future is going to have 
to put some big well, some money into his 
business in order to stay up with the 
competition. And that, of course any time you 
are in business for yourself, you have 
got to keep it up to date or you go behind fast. 
(T. 214-215) 
There has been a substantial change of circumstances since 
entry of the Decree of Divorce in that (1) Plaintiff's earnings 
went from virtually zero in 1985 to at least $17,000 per year (T. 
214); (2) Defendant's earnings decreased from $118,600 to $81,600 
per year (T.214); and Defendant needs to make some large capital 
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improvements to his business in order to maintain it in its present 
condition. Thus, Defendant met his burden of establishing a 
material and substantial change of circumstances and the Court's 
original ruling, supplemented by Defendant's proposed additional 
Findings of Fact, should be affirmed. 
II. SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES AS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S INCOME 
Plaintiff claims that the evidence at trial supports her 
proposed Findings Nos. 14, 15, 16, 17 and 18, which is simply not 
the case. The most credible evidence, the evidence which the Court 
believed at trial, was that both parties had experienced a decrease 
in the standard of the lifestyle they enjoyed during their 
marriage. Defendant testified that he had taken very few trips, 
mostly just weekend trips to visit friends (T. 95-96) and that he 
had sold his plane and his boat shortly before or after the divorce 
(T.106-107) . 
There was simply no evidence, other than Plaintiff's 
inconsistent testimony, regarding her "very high housing costs," 
presented at trial. Plaintiff testified that she lived with her 
mother (T.165), but also testified that she paid rent to live in 
her mother's home (T.170). There was no evidence presented at 
trial regarding whether she actually is required to pay rent to her 
mother and this finding should not be accepted by the Court. 
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Plaintiff's losses on the rental of the Salt Lake City home 
were due in part to her decision to rent the home to friends at a 
substantially reduced rental rate and to continue to pay the 
utilities on that property during the period of their occupancy. 
Defendant should not be penalized for Plaintiff's decision to 
discount the rental rate on the property. 
Plaintiff's proposed Findings Nos. 19, 20, 21 and 22 should 
not be accepted by the Court for the reason that they do not 
comport to the findings made by the Court after the trial. 
Further, they do not take into consideration all sources of 
Plaintiff's income, as testified to at trial, including her wages, 
rental income, both from the Salt Lake City residence and the barn, 
and the money she receives from the family trust. 
The Court concluded that there had been a substantial change 
of circumstances in this case, but not one of "lifestyle" but 
rather in the "income of the parties.1' (T. 213) 
III. FINDINGS ON ATTORNEY'S FEES 
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 24 includes fees that 
Plaintiff incurred from the law firm of Van Cott, Bagley in the 
amount of $13,179, as well as fees and costs as proffered by 
Plaintiff's counsel at trial, estimated at $2,600. There was no 
testimony as to the reasonableness of the fees offered by 
Plaintiff's counsel as to the VanCott, Bagley amount, and the Court 
had no record of the Affidavit allegedly submitted by Plaintiff's 
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prior counsel, Mr. McNulty, as to the reasonableness of those fees. 
(T. 194) 
Plaintiff's proposed Finding No. 25 takes great liberties with 
the Court's ruling and makes findings that the Court did not make 
at trial. Specifically, the Court did not find that Plaintiff's 
expenses exceeded her monthly income, and did not find that it 
would be a "hardship" for Plaintiff to pay her own fees unassisted 
by Defendant. The Court did express concern about the $22,000 in 
attorney's fees incurred by the parties in this case, however, and 
concluded that Plaintiff did need to "meet" the petition filed by 
the Defendant. (T. 215) 
The Court did not determine, nor can it be implied from the 
Court's ruling, that Defendant should pay all of Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees of $16,000, as Plaintiff has claimed in her 
proposed Findings. The Court awarded Plaintiff $3,000 in 
attorney's fees. The Utah Court of Appeals on remand directed this 
Court to enter its Findings as to (1) Plaintiff's need for 
attorney's fees; (2) Defendant's ability to assist Plaintiff in 
paying her fees; and (3) the reasonableness of the fees charged. 
[See Defendant's proposed Findings 19-23.] 
WHEREFORE, Defendant respectfully asks this Court for the 
following relief: 
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1. For its Order denying Plaintiff's Motion for Order in Re: 
Entry of Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order of 
Modification on Remand; 
2. For its Order granting Defendant's Motion for Order in 
Re: Entry of Supplemental Findings of Fact; 
3. For its Order affirming its decision made at the time of 
trial, specifically as follows: 
(a) Reducing Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff 
to the amount of $900 per month; 
(b) Ordering Defendant to pay $3,000 of Plaintiff's 
attorney's fees and costs; 
4. Awarding such other and further relief as the Court deems 
fair and equitable in the premises, 
DATED this [ ^ day of June, 1993. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
AJUJT 
HELEN E. CHRISTIAN 
Attorney for Defendant 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, 
a true and correct copy of the foregoing DEFENDANT'S OBJECTIONS TO 
PLAINTIFF'S PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT this _\ day of June, 1993, 
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SUZANNE MARELIUS 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, UT 84102 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MUIR, MARITA W 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
MUIR, MICHAEL DOUGLAS 
DEFENDANT 
TYPE OF HEARING: HEARING 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. MARELIUS, SUZANNE 
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MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 844903928 DA 
DATE 08/19/93 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK DAG 
OBJECTION TO FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW ARE 
DISCUSSED, BUT NOT RESOLVED. 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MUIR, MARITA W 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
MUIR, MICHAEL DOUGLAS 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 844903 928 DA 
DATE 12/22/93 
HONORABLE HOMER F WILKINSON 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK DAG 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
THE COURT HAVING REVIEWED THE PLEADINGS, TRANSCRIPT OF 
TRIAL AND DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND IS PERSUADED 
THAT THE COURT OF APPEALS FOUND THAT ERROR WAS COMMITTED AND HAS 
REVERSED THE DECISION OF THE TRIAL COURT. THEREFORE, THE COURT 
ADOPTS PLAINTIFF'S FINDINGS OF FACT & CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER 
REMAND AND ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION ON 
REMAND AS MODIFIED BY THE COURT. PLAINTIFF IS ALSO AWARDED 
ATTORNEY FEES OF $4,507.50 AND COSTS OF $906.00 EXPENDED ON THE 
APPEAL. PLAINTIFF SHALL PREPARE NEW PLEADINGS. 
CC: SUZANNE MARELIUS 
HELEN CHRISTIAN 
A'fel 
AA.9S1 
i h»fu Judicial" District 
JAN 2 0 394 
By. 
SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Telephone: (801) 531-0435 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARITA W. MUIR, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. MUIR, 
Defendant. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER 
REMAND 
Case No. 844903928 DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
ooOoo 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12, 
1992 with instructions that the Court make specific findings, 
supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony, 
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees. Both 
Plaintiff and Defendant submitted to the Court proposed Findings of 
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order after Remand. The Court held a 
hearing with counsel on August 17, 1993, at 8:00 a.m. and heard 
argument on the matter. The Court took the matter under advisement 
and issued a written Minute Entry on December 22, 1993, adopting 
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the Plaintiff's proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and 
Order on Remand, with certain modifications. The Court further 
awarded the Plaintiff her costs and attorneys fees related to the 
Appeal. 
Having reviewed the Court records and transcript herein, 
the parties Motions and proposed Findings and Order, the Court 
issues the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law on 
remand to supplement the previous Findings entered in this case 
arising from the Modification Trial held on October 11, 1990. The 
Court enters the following Findings of Fact on Remand as follows: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The parties were married for more than twenty years 
prior to their divorce on September 16, 1985. 
2. The initial divorce was resolved by joint 
stipulation of the parties and each party received an equal 
property distribution which provided in relevant part that the 
husband receive all common stock owned by the parties in the 
business known as Fairmont Bowl and that the wife receive the 
parties7 residence. The husband was ordered to assume the 
liability for business loans incurred by Fairmont Bowl and the wife 
was ordered to assume the mortgage debt on the residence. 
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3. The Defendant was ordered to pay the Plaintiff 
alimony of $1,500 per month until her remarriage, cohabitation, the 
death of one of the parties, or further order of the Court. 
4. During the majority of the parties7 marriage and at 
the time of the divorce, the Defendant derived all of his income 
from his ownership of Fairmont Bowl and at the time of divorce 
owned 78% of the stock in the entity. At the time of the 
modification hearing his stock ownership had increased to 91.3%, 
with the parties' children owned the remainder of the stock. 
5. In August, 1989, five years after the divorce the 
Defendant petitioned for modification of alimony claiming a 
substantial change in material circumstance and he sought a 
reduction of alimony for one year, followed by complete 
termination. The Defendant based his petition on a claim that his 
income had decreased and that the Plaintiff's income had increased. 
A trial was held on the Defendant's Petition on October 11, 1990, 
at which both parties testified along with accounting expert 
witnesses. 
A. Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding Defendant/s 
Earnings. 
6. The Defendant alleged specific changes in 
circumstances in that although his gross revenues from his business 
had remained consistent, that his expenses had increased, 
3 
AM 
00284 
depreciation had decreased and his business needed capital 
investment. 
7. Plaintiff's accountant Mr. Randall Peterson, CPAf 
analyzed seven years of tax returns from 1983 through 1989 filed by 
the Defendant. He testified that the returns showed an average 
"pre-divorce" income of to Defendant $104,678 and an average "post-
divorce" income of $104,188. Accountant Peterson analyzed the 
Defendant's "net spendable income" from 1983 to 1989 showing his 
post-divorce average (excluding alimony payments), to be $69,194 
which was approximately $5,000 more than his before divorce average 
of $64,819. 
8. The Defendant's accountant Mr. Ed Bates agreed with 
Plaintiff's accountant that the gross revenues of the Fairmont Bowl 
Corporation have been consistent and that it has been operated as 
a Subchapter S Corporation since the parties' divorce. On this 
point, the accountants relied on the 1985 tax return for the fiscal 
year ending June 30, 1985 showing gross receipts to be $691,529 as 
compared with gross receipts at the end of fiscal year June 30, 
1990 where gross receipts were $645,102. 
9. The Defendant has made improvements to the Fairmont 
Bowl facility and had just finished computerizing the facility, 
added new carpeting, new racks, new seating and other improvements 
since the divorce. Defendant testified to the need for future 
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improvements as well. Such capital improvements are in the 
discretion of Defendant whose personal and business finances are 
intertwined. 
10. Since the divorce, Defendant has prepared four 
separate financial statements for First Interstate Bank which show 
that his total assets and net worth since entry of the divorce as 
stated by him have increased from at least $715,580 in assets on 
the statement dated January 3, 1986 to $989,000 in assets on a 
statement dated September 7, 1989. 
11. Both Plaintiff's and Defendant's accountants 
testified that due to the corporation's Subchapter S status, the 
Defendant had total discretion over the amount he took as 
compensation each year, in setting prices for his product, and in 
making capital expenditures. 
12. The Defendant's business has paid for many personal 
expenses for the Defendant and his family including payments for 
his family car, health insurance, travel, auto and life insurance, 
tax deferred benefits including pension contributions. Defendant 
benefits from his new wife drawing a salary from the corporation. 
13. Based on the foregoing evidence and Findings, the 
Court finds that there has not been a substantial change in the 
circumstances surrounding Defendant's earnings since the parties 
divorce. His income has been consistent when all personal benefits 
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are considered and given the Defendant's discretion over allocating 
income between personal and business uses, it is appropriate to 
include all such personal benefits. 
B. Findings on Changes in Circumstances Regarding Plaintiff's 
Income. 
14. The Court finds that the Plaintiff's only work 
during the marriage was at Fairmont Bowl where her wages were 
approximately $1,000 per month. At the time of the modification 
hearing Plaintiff was working as a flight attendant for American 
Airlines earning $1,400 gross monthly income. Plaintiff's 
employment required her to locate on the East Coast where she 
resided in a basement apartment in her mother's home in Connecticut 
for which she paid rent. 
15. Plaintiff has attempted to sell the marital asset 
she received in the divorce consisting of the parties' marital 
residence in Salt Lake City valued at $370,000 at the time of the 
divorce. The Plaintiff had lowered the sales price to $280,000 and 
had received only one offer of $185,000 which she rejected. She 
has continued to maintain the Salt Lake home as a rental property 
and paying mortgage thereon. 
16. At the time of Trial on October 1990, the 
Plaintiff's rental income to date had been $4,200 and her mortgage 
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costs had been $5,478 with additional estimated taxes of $3,000 
which would result in an income loss that year. 
17. Plaintiff's monthly living expenses totalled $4,701 
per month which included keeping two homes and $907 per month on 
installment debt relating to legal fees connected with the original 
divorce and to repay her mother a $4,000 loan. 
18. Since the divorce Plaintiff has had significant 
periods of unemployment, higher costs of living with the necessity 
of maintaining two homes, and her tax returns show regular losses 
from business and real estate. Plaintiff has been dependent on her 
alimony of $1,500 per month to meet her basic living expenses which 
do not include any of the luxuries or amenities she enjoyed during 
her marriage to Defendant such as vacations, country club 
memberships, or new vehicles. 
19. A review of Plaintiff's tax return shows that in 
only one year, 1988, did her earned income exceeded her alimony 
income, when she earned $20,609 in wages. However, for the year 
1990 Plaintiff projected total earnings of only $17,000 which is 
less than her alimony. Although Plaintiff's income may have 
increased from $1,000 to $1,400 per month it is not sufficiently 
large of a change to support a reduction of alimony in this case 
considering Plaintiff's needs. 
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C. Findings on Attorney's Fees, 
20. The Plaintiff requested that she be reimbursed her 
attorney's fees in defending the modification petition. At the 
time of the modification hearing, Plaintiff was still paying the 
legal costs of the initial divorce and owed her divorce attorney 
$16,000 which she was paying at $100 a month. 
21. Plaintiff incurred $13,179 to the law firm of 
VanCott Bagley and $2600 to present counsel in legal fees for 
defending the modification proceeding and Defendant had incurred 
$6,000 in bringing the modification petition. Plaintiff's counsel 
proffered the reasonableness and amount of fees without objection 
by Defendant's counsel. 
22. The Court finds Plaintiff has a need for attorney's 
fees, based on her financial circumstances including the fact that 
her present monthly expenses exceed her monthly income. In 
addition Plaintiff is still paying on a significant balance for 
legal fees remaining from her original divorce. The Plaintiff also 
had a significantly more difficult task to defend against the 
modification brought by Defendant to uncover necessary financial 
information whereas Defendant had that information within his 
control. The Defendant has also paid off significant debts since 
the time of the parties' divorce, has invested in costly real 
estate and is building a home, and thus has the ability to assist 
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Plaintiff in the payment of fees. Defendant should pay the full 
amount of Plaintiff's attorney's fees in the amount of $15,779, 
less credit for the $3,000 he was ordered to pay at the initial 
trial in this matter for an attorney fee award of $12,779. 
P. FINDINGS ON ATTORNEYS FEES FOR APPEAL 
23. The Court finds that the Plaintiff substantially 
prevailed on the Trial issues heard on October 11, 1990, and has a 
need for an award of attorneys fees and has been awarded her fees 
arising from that trial. The Defendant filed an Appeal to the 
Court of Appeals and Plaintiff has filed an Affidavit of Attorneys 
Fees on Appeal which has not been objected to. The Court finds 
Plaintiff's fees on Appeal to be reasonable and awards Plaintiff 
and judgment against Defendant in the amount of $4,505.50. The 
Plaintiff is also awarded her costs relating to the Appeal in the 
amount of $906.00 for a total amount of fees and costs arising from 
the Appeal of $5,413.50. 
E. FINDINGS ON ALIMONY UNDERPAYMENT DURING PENDENCY OF APPEAL 
24. The Trial Court initially ruled that Defendant could 
decrease his alimony payment of $1,500 per month to $900 per month 
and this Order took effect commencing with the month of October 
1990. The Trial Court has not reinstated Plaintiff's alimony at 
the level of $1,500 per month effective with the month of January, 
1994. The Court finds Plaintiff has been underpaid alimony by the 
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Defendant in the amount of $600 per month for a period of thirty-
nine (39) months and is awarded a judgment against Defendant for 
that arrearage in the amount of $23,400. The Defendant is ordered 
to reinstate Plaintiff's alimony at the level of $1,500 per month 
effective with the month of January, 1994. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes 
and enters the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. This Court has jurisdiction over the parties to the 
action and over the subject matter of this action. 
2. The parties are entitled to an order on Defendant's 
Petition for Modification, the same to become final and effective 
upon being signed by the Court which should be in conformance with 
the foregoing Findings of Fact. . ^  
DATED this X ^ day of / ^ i / • , ±9*3": 
BY THE COURT: 
HONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AFTER REMAND, this // day o f c f a ^ r , 199/, 
to: 
Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
sl2\12485.fo£ 
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Deputy Clsrti SUZANNE MARELIUS - 2081 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
LITTLEFIELD & PETERSON 
426 South 500 East 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
ooOoo 
MARITA W. MUIR, 
f-\ v Q> 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
MICHAEL D. MUIR, 
Defendant. 
^ V " * - . ORDER ON DEFENDANT^ 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION 
ON REMAND 
^ C C x> o 9 3 
Case No. 844903928 DA 
Judge Homer F. Wilkinson 
ooOoo 
The Utah Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the 
above-referenced case to the Third District Court on November 12, 
1992 with instructions that the Court make specific findings, 
supported by sufficient evidence regarding the issues of alimony, 
substantial change in circumstances, and attorney's fees. The 
Court has entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law on 
Remand pursuant to those instructions, and good cause appearing 
therefore, enters the following Order: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED that: 
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1. The Petition for reduction and termination of 
alimony filed by Defendant is denied and the Court finds there has 
been no substantial material change in circumstances of the parties 
since the divorce to warrant a modification of alimony. 
2. The Defendant is ordered to pay all of Plaintiff's 
costs and attorneys fees incurred in defending the Petition for 
Modification which total $15,779, less credit for $3,000 of fees 
ordered in the initial trial, and Plaintiff is awarded a judgment 
of $12,779. 
3. Plaintiff is awarded her attorneys fees arising from 
having to Appeal the decision in this matter and is awarded the 
amount of $4,507.50 and costs of $906.00 for a total amount of 
$5,413.50 arising from the Appeal in this matter and Plaintiff is 
awarded a judgment therefore. 
4• During the pendency of the Appeal the Defendant has 
underpaid alimony to the Plaintiff in the amount of $600 per month 
for a period of thirty-nine (39) months. Plaintiff is thus awarded 
a judgment for this alimony arrears in the amount of $23,400. 
5. Defendant's alimony obligation to Plaintiff is 
reinstated at the level of $1,500 per month effective with the 
month of January, 1994, and continuing thereafter. 
6. All judgments awarded to Plaintiff in this matter 
are to bear interest at the legal rate of 5.72 percent until paid 
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and are to include after accruing costs of collection including 
reasonable attorneys fees. 
DATED this 2l daY of O/^*^ ^ , 1994* 
ONORABLE HOMER F. WILKINSON 
District Court Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that I caused to be hand delivered, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing, ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S 
PETITION FOR MODIFICATION ON REMAND, this /( day o f ^ S ^ 
199$l, to: 
Ms. Helen E. Christian, Esq. 
GUSTIN & CHRISTIAN 
Suite 722, Boston Building 
#9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Defendant 
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